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ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT POLICY ALIGNMENTS
Todd S. Aagaard*
Abstract: Energy law focuses on making energy widely available at reasonable cost, and
environmental law focuses on preventing pollution. As a result of these differences in their
respective orientations, the two fields often work incoherently and even in conflict.
Historically, federal energy law and environmental law have attempted to manage their
interrelationships by imposing negative constraints on each other: Energy policies of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must comply with requirements set forth in
environmental statutes, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) statutes contain
energy-related requirements and exemptions. More recently, however, FERC and EPA have
begun developing policies that create beneficial alignments between their respective fields.
This Article argues that these policy alignments, which emphasize opportunities for positive
synergy rather than negative constraints, offer a promising new direction for the energyenvironment relationship. More broadly, policy alignments provide a potentially useful
model for managing relationships among other overlapping fields as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy and the environment, which have long overlapped, are now
converging to an unprecedented extent. Consider the following
examples:
 Energy production, energy markets, and energy use are driving
many important and difficult environmental issues of our time.
Energy-related activities account for 84.3% of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.1 Burning coal for
heat and power generation produces millions of tons per year of
fly ash, bottom ash, and boiler slag, the disposal of which can
contaminate land and water.2
 Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have rapidly
transformed the United States’ energy economy. Domestic
natural gas production from shale gas wells increased from 2.87
trillion cubic feet in 2008 to 11.90 trillion cubic feet in 2013.3 In

1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-14-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2012, at 3-1 (2014) [hereinafter INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS]. The data is for 2012.
2. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUE IN MINES 23, 26
(2006); Shaila Dewan, Hundreds of Coal Ash Dumps, with Virtually No Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2009, at A1; Michael Wines & Timothy Williams, Huge Leak of Coal Ash Slows at North
Carolina Power Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2014, at A11.
3. See U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
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2010, the United States was the world’s largest importer of
natural gas;4 some analysts project that the United States will
become a net exporter of natural gas as soon as 2016.5 This
dramatic escalation of production has implications for pollution
issues across all environmental media—air, water, and land—
and a range of natural resource issues as well.6
 Legal and technical developments in the nation’s electricity grid
have important ramifications for the development of alternative
energy sources and technologies that may reduce the use of
fossil fuels and their attendant environmental issues.
Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities that generate power
at large, centralized, fossil fuel-fired power plants have
dominated the electric power industry.7 More recently, technical,
legal, and economic innovations have enabled and supported the
development of more decentralized power services.8 Much of
this new wave of power services utilizes renewable energy and
demand response resources9 that can substitute for fossil fuel
combustion-based generation, with economic and environmental
ramifications.10
Contrary to the convergence of energy issues and environmental
concerns, however, energy law and environmental law have stayed

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_a.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
4. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, NATURAL GAS INFORMATION, at V.5 tbl.2 (2012).
5. See Brian Scheid, LNG Growth to Make US Net Natural Gas Exporter by 2016, PLATTS
MCGRAW HILL FIN. (Jan. 9, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.platts.com/latest-news/naturalgas/washington/lng-growth-to-make-us-net-natural-gas-exporter-21054975.
6. See Symposium, Environmental and Social Implications of Hydraulic Fracturing and Gas
Drilling in the United States: An Integrative Workshop for the Evaluation of the State of Science
and Policy, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 245, 250 (2012) (noting that environmental concerns
associated with hydraulic fracturing and gas drilling include “water pollution, air pollution,
landscape effects, habitat loss, and potential human health effects”).
7. See Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 70 Fed.
Reg. 34,190, 34,191 (June 13, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2006]
(stating that “the electric industry was once primarily the domain of vertically integrated utilities
generating power at large centralized plants”); Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and
Deregulated Markets, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 259, 275–76 (2006) (noting that “centralized
fossil fuel burning power plants is . . . the dominant form of electricity generation”).
8. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191.
9. Demand response refers to reductions in electric energy consumption in response to an increase
in price or to incentive payments. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2014).
10. Cf. Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean A Death Spiral for
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (noting “a wave of innovation in energy markets that
manifests as disruptive competition for electric utilities”).
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separate.11 Existing efforts to manage the energy-environment
relationship, focused on merely preventing outright conflicts, have
largely failed to reconcile the two fields.12 This Article argues in favor of
an alternative model for bridging the energy-environment divide by
creating policy alignments—policies that simultaneously support the
objectives of energy law and environmental law. Policy alignments
leverage opportunities for positive synergy and offer a promising new
direction for the energy-environment relationship.
Energy law and environmental law remain divided because of
differences in their respective orientations. Energy law seeks to keep
energy costs low. Like other energy agencies, the lead federal energy
regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), focuses
on economic regulation to make energy widely available to end users at
reasonable cost.13 For much of the twentieth century, energy policy
promoted and benefited from economies of scale in the energy sector, in
which increasing energy production leads to decreasing energy prices.14
Low energy costs therefore depended on increasing energy use, and
increasing energy use entailed increasing environmental impacts.15
Moreover, policies aimed at making energy available and affordable also
incentivized the use of coal, a fuel with historically low cost and ready
availability but high pollutant emissions.16 Thus, energy law’s goal of

11. See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 473, 494 (2010) (describing energy law’s and environmental law’s “opposing
regulatory goals” as a manifestation of an “energy-environment disconnect”); Hari M. Osofsky,
Complex Value Choices at the Environment-Energy Interface, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 261,
269 (2014) (referencing “the energy-environment divide”). At the state level, the divide is
somewhat less clear and less stark, although it is present to a significant extent. See generally
Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions (2006),
7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties]
(cataloging the explicit and implicit authorities of state public utility commissions to incorporate
environmental considerations in their decisions); Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental Duties
of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2001) [hereinafter Dworkin et al.,
Environmental Duties] (same, five years earlier); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the
Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013)
(discussing state energy-related climate change policies that are creating energy-environment
linkages).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 378 (2d ed.
2011); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L.
REV. 355, 374–75 (1990).
15. See, e.g., EFSTATHIOS E. (STATHIS) MICHAELIDES, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 33
(2012) (noting environmental effects of increasing energy production and use).
16. See, e.g., Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to
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low energy costs has had the effect of stimulating energy use and
production and the environmental harms they cause.
Environmental law has attempted to reduce environmental harms
from energy-related activities such as power generation. The lead federal
environmental regulator, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
focuses on preventing pollution and damage to natural resources.17
Reducing environmentally harmful emissions and discharges, however,
generally costs money. The costs of installing pollution control
equipment at a single coal-fired power plant, for example, may exceed
$200 million.18 Thus, environmental regulations often increase the costs
of energy production and use.
This energy-environment divide does not entail a complete separation
between the two fields. FERC’s energy statutes are subject to
environmental requirements, and EPA’s environmental statutes contain
energy requirements. But this limited cross-incorporation does little to
transcend the divide. Instead, it adopts a negative model that attempts to
manage energy-environment relationships by using requirements from
one field to constrain the other: Environmental requirements constrain
FERC,19 and energy requirements constrain EPA.20 Negative constraints
thus, by their very design, place energy and environmental goals in
opposition, exacerbating the energy-environment divide. Negative
constraints also have limited efficacy because agencies have an incentive
to avoid or minimize requirements that attempt to divert them from their
core missions. Even when negative constraints are effective, they
impede rather than empower agencies.
Against this backdrop of an energy-environment divide, there is a
promising alternative model for managing the energy-environment
overlap. Within their respective jurisdictions, both FERC and EPA have
Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 717 (1995) (noting that federal energy policies under
President Carter “sought to pressure utilities and industry to switch from oil and gas to more
plentiful and domestically available coal”); see also Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air
Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 65 (2012) (noting high pollutant
emissions from coal combustion); David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity
Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 214 (2005) (referring to coal as a “historically cheap
source of power”).
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See George W. Sharp, Update: What’s That Scrubber Going to Cost?, 151 POWER MAG. 56,
56 (2007) (reporting results of a survey of coal-fired power plants showing scrubber costs
“consistently above $300/kW” for units with an average capacity of 956 MW); see generally
Tomain, supra note 14, at 366 (stating that environmental and health and safety regulations “raised
the cost of doing business” for the coal industry).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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developed some policies that take advantage of circumstances in which
energy goals and environmental goals align. These policy alignments
involve policies in one field that align with, without directly adopting,
the objectives of another field. Policy alignments thus allow each agency
to pursue its respective mission and to utilize its specific expertise, but in
ways that support the other’s policy objectives. Policy alignments create
significant opportunities for progress in constructively managing the
energy-environment divide. As the energy-environment overlap grows,
increasing the interdependence of energy law and environmental law,
energy and environmental regulators should identify and exploit
opportunities for energy-environment policy alignments.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains how traditional
energy law and environmental law reflect competing paradigms that
create a divide between their respective approaches. Part II examines
how federal energy law and environmental law have historically
attempted to manage their overlap by imposing negative constraints on
each other: FERC’s energy policies must comply with requirements set
forth in environmental statutes, and EPA’s environmental statutes
contain energy-related requirements and exemptions. Part III introduces
examples of policies that create alignments between energy policies and
environmental policies. These energy-environment policy alignments
form the basis for an alternative model for managing energyenvironment relationships, a model oriented toward creating positive
synergy rather than imposing negative constraints. The Article concludes
by arguing that the policy alignment model offers a promising new
direction for the energy-environment relationship, and potentially for
other overlapping regulatory fields as well.21

21. Although the energy-environment divide exists under state regulatory regimes as well, this
Article focuses on the divide as it is manifested in federal law. Focusing on the single federal
system, rather than the diversity of state regimes, keeps the Article more manageable. For example,
state environmental policies are a hybrid of programs that implement federal statutes under the
cooperative federalism model and elements, sometimes contained within the same programs,
created independently by the state. How this dynamic affects the ability of states to create energyenvironment policy alignments is an important question deserving of an entire article unto itself.
That said, innovative policies that create energy-environment linkages at the federal level are likely
to trickle down to state programs. In addition, federal law provides a worthwhile focus because the
energy-environment divide is particularly stark under federal law. As other energy scholars have
previously shown, some states have taken significant steps toward creating energy-environment
linkages, often through legislation. See Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties, supra
note 11; Dworkin et al., Environmental Duties, supra note 11; Klass, supra note 11. Thus, the
administrative energy-environment policy alignments examined in this Article have a special
efficacy in federal law that may well trickle down to state law, whereas state legislation creating
energy-environment linkages is unlikely to induce similar federal innovation.
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Federal policies regarding energy production, transmission,
distribution, and use sprawl across many areas of law, many statutes, and
many different federal agencies. A few examples include the following:
 The Department of Energy establishes energy conservation
standards for residential products and commercial and industrial
equipment,22 pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act.23
 The Secretary of the Interior leases federal lands for the
extraction of minerals—including oil, gas, and coal—under the
Mineral Leasing Act.24
 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues licenses for nuclear
power plants,25 pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act.26
 The Mining Safety and Health Administration regulates coal
mining to protect miner health and safety,27 pursuant to the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 197728 and the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of
2006.29
Historically, however, the locus of federal regulatory authority over
the energy sector has been FERC and, before that, its predecessor
agency, the Federal Power Commission.30 FERC’s primary legal
22. 10 C.F.R. §§ 429.1–431.442 (2014).
23. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). Although the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act initially delegated authority to the Federal Energy
Administration, the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat.
565, subsequently created the Department of Energy and transferred the Federal Energy
Administration’s authority to the Department of Energy. Id. § 301(a), 91 Stat. at 577 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7151(a)(C) (2012)).
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2012); see also Bruce M. Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How
Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. 599, 602
(2010) (noting that, as of 2008, thirty-nine million acres of federal land were subject to oil and gas
leases).
25. 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.0–52.303.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13.
27. 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1–90.301 (2014).
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965.
29. Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965).
30. The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, created
FERC and transferred most of the Federal Power Commission’s authority to FERC. Id. § 401(a), 91
Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171) (creating FERC); id. § 402(a), 91 Stat. at 583–84
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authority derives from traditional energy statutes such as the Natural Gas
Act31 and Federal Power Act.32 Congress enacted these statutes to
protect consumers from monopolist natural gas companies and electric
utilities that could use their market power to charge excessive rates.33
In the early twentieth century, regulation of the energy sector was
primarily a matter of state law. State statutes established public utility
commissions—sometimes also called public service commissions or
corporation commissions—to regulate sales of natural gas and electricity
by public utilities.34 These state statutes, which generally require public
utilities to sell energy on terms that are “just and reasonable,” often
substantially predated federal energy statutes.35 In the 1920s, however,
the Supreme Court held that the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes
states from regulating interstate energy activities.36 These Supreme
Court decisions created gaps in state regulatory authority over interstate
energy activities.
Congress enacted the federal energy statutes in the 1930s to plug the

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)) (transferring various Federal Power Commission authorities to
FERC).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012).
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c (2012).
33. See NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1976) (“In the case of the Power
and Gas Acts it is clear that the principal purpose of those Acts was to encourage the orderly
development of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at reasonable prices.”); Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) (“The primary aim of this legislation
[the Natural Gas Act] was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas
companies.”); Mun. Light Bds. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Its
[the Federal Power Act’s] primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and
charges.”); United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Federal regulation
of the natural gas industry is thus designed to curb pipelines’ potential monopoly power over gas
transportation. The enormous economies of scale involved in the construction of natural gas
pipelines tend to make the transportation of gas a natural monopoly.” (footnotes omitted)).
34. See, e.g., Shawnee Gas & Elec. Co. v. State, 122 P. 222 (Okla. 1912) (holding that court was
without jurisdiction to review an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission prescribing a
schedule of rates to be charged by a gas utility company).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 65 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Session)
(requiring “just and reasonable” service and rates for gas and electricity service). The New York
legislature originally enacted this provision in 1910. See Act of Jan. 5, 1910, ch. 480, § 65, 1910
N.Y. Laws 1, 59.
36. In Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1924), the Supreme Court
held that the interstate transportation of natural gas for sale to distributing companies is interstate
commerce protected from state regulation by the Dormant Commerce Clause. See also Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245 (1919). In Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam &
Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), the Court applied the rationale of Kansas Natural Gas to hold that
the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes states from regulating interstate sales of electricity. Id. at
89–90.
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gaps in state regulatory authority.37 The federal statutes maintain a
delicate and difficult balance between state and federal regulatory
authority. This balance reflects the fact that regulation of public utilities
has long been a core function of state government but the energy sector
involves many interstate activities that require a federal role.38
The Federal Power Act originated as the Federal Water Power Act of
1920,39 which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) as an
independent regulatory commission and authorized it to issue licenses
for facilities and equipment used to produce hydropower on waterbodies
subject to federal jurisdiction over foreign and interstate commerce. 40 In
addition to giving the FPC authority to license hydropower facilities, the
1920 Act also authorized the Commission to regulate electricity sold
from such hydropower into interstate or foreign commerce to ensure that
“rates charged and the service rendered” for such power are “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory, and just to the consumer.”41 The 1920 Act thus
essentially adopted the “just and reasonable” standard from state public
utility statutes and applied it to a matter under federal jurisdiction.
In 1935, Congress, acting to plug the gaps in regulatory authority
created by Supreme Court decisions limiting state authority over
interstate electricity transactions,42 amended the Federal Water Power
Act to create the Federal Power Act.43 The 1935 legislation added a new
subchapter giving the FPC authority to regulate electric utility
companies engaged in interstate commerce.44 Specifically, the Federal
Power Act granted the FPC jurisdiction to regulate “the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce.”45 The Act generally excludes
generation facilities, local distribution facilities, facilities used only for
intrastate transmission of electric power, and facilities for transmission
of power used wholly by the transmitter.46
37. See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1983)
(explaining that Congress enacted the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act to fill the regulatory
gaps created by Kansas Natural Gas and Attleboro).
38. See id. at 377.
39. Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–823d
(2012)).
40. Federal Water Power Act §§ 1, 4(e), 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797(e).
41. Id. § 20, 16 U.S.C. § 813.
42. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
43. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
44. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w.
45. Federal Power Act § 201(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
46. Id. § 201(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). These exclusions are not complete. For example, the
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In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act47 created FERC
and gave it authority over, among other things, administration and
enforcement of the Federal Power Act.48 FERC’s primary regulatory role
under the Federal Power Act is to ensure that wholesale electricity rates
are just, reasonable, and not unduly preferential.49 The Federal Power
Act also gives FERC other responsibilities, such as directing public
utilities to interconnect with someone engaged in the transmission or
sale of electricity.50
In addition to FERC’s authority over electric power transmission and
wholesale sales under the Federal Power Act, other federal energy
statutes give FERC jurisdiction over interstate natural gas and oil
transactions. Because later parts of this Article focus on the Federal
Power Act,51 these other energy statutes will receive only brief mention
here. The Natural Gas Act, enacted in 1938,52 allows FERC to regulate
interstate transportation of natural gas, sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale, and import or export of natural gas in foreign
commerce.53 FERC also regulates interstate oil pipelines, pursuant to the
Federal Power Act gives FERC authority to regulate wholesale rates of electric generating facilities
in interstate commerce. See Miss. Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1543–45 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d,
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
47. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
48. Id. § 401(a), 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012)) (creating FERC); id.
§ 402(a)(1)(A), (B), (F), (2)(A), 91 Stat. at 583–84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A), (B), (F),
(2)(A)) (transferring the FPC’s authority under the Federal Power Act to FERC).
49. Federal Power Act § 205(a)–(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b).
50. Id. § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b).
51. See infra Part A.
52. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938).
53. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012). The Act exempts so-called Hinshaw
pipelines—local distribution pipelines within a state that, although they receive gas from interstate
pipelines that originate in other states, convey gas for consumption only within the same state. Id.
§ 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 143 F.3d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir.
1998). As with the Federal Power Act, Congress originally charged FPC with administering the
Natural Gas Act, see ch. 556, § 2(9), 52 Stat. at 822, but transferred that responsibility to FERC in
1977. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a)(1)(C)–(F),
(2)(B), 91 Stat. 565, 583–84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C)–(F), (2)(B)). For natural gasrelated activities within its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, FERC issues certificates of public
convenience and necessity authorizing companies to transport or sell natural gas, Natural Gas Act
§ 7(c)–(h), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)–(h); see also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 14, at 288 (describing
the certificate of public convenience and necessity as “a license requirement subjecting a company
to federal jurisdiction and allowing the company to operate in interstate commerce”), approves
facilities, see Natural Gas Act § 3(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e) (authorizing FERC to approve or deny
applications for FERC liquid natural gas terminals); id. § 7(a)–(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a)–(b)
(authorizing FERC to approve the extension, improvement, or abandonment of natural gas facilities
within its jurisdiction), and regulates terms of sale and transport to ensure that they are just,
reasonable, and not unduly preferential, see id. § 3(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(f).
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Interstate Commerce Act.54
B.

Environmental Law

EPA is charged with administering, in whole or in part, at least
twenty-three separate statutes.55 A few of these statutes, however, form
the core of the agency’s regulatory responsibilities and comprise much
of the canon of federal environmental law.56 This environmental law
canon has a history very different from that of the traditional energy
statutes.
Congress enacted the federal energy statutes primarily during the
1930s, and they largely reflected an extension of state public utilities
statutes that had existed for decades.57 By contrast, the federal
environmental statutes Congress enacted in the 1970s represented a
dramatic change in environmental regulation that has been called the

54. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.). The original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 created the Interstate
Commerce Commission to regulate interstate and international railroads. Id. § 1, 24 Stat. at 379.
The Act required all charges for such railroad services to be “reasonable and just,” id., and required
railroads to act as common carriers, prohibited from giving undue preferences and required to post
fares and schedules. Id. §§ 3, 6, 24 Stat. at 380. The Act created the Interstate Commerce
Commission to administer and enforce the statute. Id. §§ 11, 12, 24 Stat. at 383.
In 1906, Congress enacted the Hepburn Act, Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), which amended the Interstate Commerce Act and
extended it—and the Commission’s jurisdiction—to interstate and international oil pipelines. Id.
§ 1, 34 Stat. at 584. In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91
Stat. 565 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 3 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.), created FERC and gave it authority over oil pipelines under the
Interstate Commerce Act. Id. § 401(a), 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171) (creating
FERC); id. § 402(b), 91 Stat. at 584 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172) (transferring the Interstate
Commerce Commission’s authority over oil pipelines to FERC). In 1978, Congress repealed the
Interstate Commerce Act but retained FERC’s existing authority over oil pipelines. Act of Oct. 17,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 1337, 1470. This effectively subjects oil pipelines to the
version of the Interstate Commerce Act in effect in 1977. See Frontier Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 452
F.3d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Exxon Pipeline Co. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1467, 1468 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
55. See
Laws
and
Executive Orders,
U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders?_ga=1.264553807.1962208094.
1383849018 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
56. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1251 (2014).
Other statutes that comprise the canon include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h, and Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012), both
of which give EPA some authority but apply more generally throughout the federal government. See
Aagaard, supra, at 1257–59 (classifying NEPA and the ESA as “special cases” within the
environmental law canon).
57. See supra Part I.A.
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Environmental Law Revolution.58 These landmarks were enacted in a
surge of legislative activity that “appeared to come virtually out of
nowhere,” but in fact the seeds of which had been germinating for
years.59 Longstanding natural resource statutes, such as the National
Park Service Organic Act,60 embodied a continuing—and growing—
concern with conserving natural resources.61 During the post-World War
II years, some segments of the public and influential leaders began
focusing on policies to protect public health.62 Environmental pollution
gained salience, driven by disasters such as air pollution that killed
scores of residents of Donora, Pennsylvania, in 1948, and by books such
as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.63 “By the end of the 1960s, a diverse
range of constituencies representing previously separate aspects of
environmental protection . . . coalesced into a broad movement
demanding changes in both the substance and the process of
environmental policy.”64 With respect to the two most prominent
environmental issues—air pollution and water pollution—Congress
acted incrementally. As early measures that focused on supporting state
regulatory efforts failed to generate results, Congress adopted a series of
measures that asserted an increasingly strong and direct federal role.65
The Clean Air Act66 is the primary federal air pollution statute.
Congress enacted the Act in 1970 “to protect and enhance the quality of
the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population.”67 As one of the early
elements of the set of landmark environmental legislation Congress
adopted in the 1970s, the Clean Air Act created a strong federal role in
air pollution regulation, following decades of repeated unsuccessful

58. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The
Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); Robert L. Fischman, What Is
Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 720 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law:
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning
for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459–60 (1996).
59. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49 (2004).
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 18f-3.
61. See LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 49–50.
62. See id. at 50–51.
63. See id. at 52, 58–60; cf. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (describing adverse
environmental impacts of pesticide use).
64. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 202–03 (2d ed. 2006).
65. See id. at 203–10; LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 52–54.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
67. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
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attempts to nudge states into taking action against air pollution.68 The
Act authorizes EPA to regulate air pollutant emissions from both
stationary sources,69 such as factories and power plants, and mobile
sources,70 such as cars, trucks, and locomotives.
The Clean Water Act71 is the primary federal water pollution statute,
water pollution’s counterpart to the Clean Air Act. Congress enacted the
Clean Water Act in 1972 “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”72 The Clean
Water Act regulates discharges of pollutants into waters of the United
States.73 The Act directs EPA to establish effluent limitations on how
much pollution can be discharged into waters of the United States.74
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)75 regulates
the handling of hazardous waste. Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to
“minimiz[e] the dangers of hazardous waste disposal.”76 RCRA’s
hallmark “cradle to grave” approach comprehensively regulates
hazardous waste from the time that it is generated until it is safely
disposed of.77 RCRA directs EPA to promulgate standards governing
hazardous waste generators,78 transporters,79 and owners and operators
of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.80
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA),81 also known as the Superfund statute,
authorizes the cleanup of environmental contamination and imposes
liability for such cleanups.82 Congress was moved to enact CERCLA in
68. See generally Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–64 (1975).
69. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 165, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7475.
70. Id. §§ 202–250, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7590.
71. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
72. Id. § 1251(a).
73. Id. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”); id. § 1362(12)
(defining “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source”); id. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” to mean “waters of the United
States”).
74. Id. § 1311. In addition to giving EPA authority to regulate wastewater discharges, the Act
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to regulate the discharge of dredge or fill material into
waters of the United States. Id. § 1344.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249.
77. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
78. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922.
79. Id. § 3003, 42 U.S.C. § 6923.
80. Id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
82. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
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1980 in response to environmental contamination at the infamous Love
Canal and other sites.83 CERCLA and RCRA thus play complementary
roles: RCRA regulates hazardous waste handling to prevent
environmental contamination, and CERCLA authorizes the cleanup of
contamination where it nevertheless has occurred.84
C.

Creating the Energy-Environment Divide

As the preceding examples illustrate, energy statutes and
environmental statutes regulate quite differently. They regulate different
things: Energy statutes primarily regulate the economic terms of energyrelated transactions, whereas environmental statutes primarily regulate
pollutant emissions and discharges into the environment. Energy statutes
and environmental statutes also regulate for different purposes: Energy
statutes regulate primarily to protect consumers’ access to affordable
energy, whereas environmental statutes regulate primarily to protect
public health and the environment.
1.

Economic Regulation and Social Regulation

To a significant extent, the differences between energy statutes and
environmental statutes reflect the distinction between economic
regulation and social regulation. Economic regulation and social
regulation can be defined by their differing objectives. Economic
regulation “intervene[s] directly in market decisions such as pricing,
competition, market entry, or exit” to improve the functioning of
markets.85 Social regulation, by contrast, “protect[s] public interests such
as health, safety, the environment, and social cohesion.”86 Economic
gives EPA “broad power . . . to clean up hazardous waste sites,” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994), and imposes strict liability on anyone who contributes—from generation
through disposal—to contamination caused by a “release, or threatened release,” of a “hazardous
substance,” see CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 n.5 (2d
Cir. 2010).
84. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1202 (“RCRA is preventative; CERCLA is curative.”).
85. See OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS 6 (1997).
86. Id.; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV.
253, 254–55 (1986) (“Economic regulation is concerned with preventing undue economic
concentration, regulating natural monopolies, eliminating economic windfalls, ensuring adequate
distribution of goods and services, and reducing fraud in economic transactions . . . . Social
regulation, by contrast, is concerned with reducing health and environmental risks, preserving civil
rights and equal opportunity, and generally controlling the extent to which one group of persons
enjoys the benefits of a technology or enterprise without sharing in its costs.”).
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regulation primarily aims at addressing market failures that arise through
monopoly and market power; social regulation primarily aims at
problems of externalities.87
Economic regulation and social regulation differ in regulatory
approach as well. Economic regulation tends to regulate on a sector or
industry-specific basis, whereas social regulation applies broadly across
the economy.88 Economic regulation adopts direct market oversight
through measures such as price controls and entry/exit controls, whereas
social regulation employs regulatory or allocative controls such as a
prohibition against certain types of discrimination.89
The traditional energy statutes—the Federal Power Act, Natural Gas
Act, and Interstate Commerce Act—typify economic regulation.
Congress enacted these energy statutes to protect consumers from
monopolist natural gas companies and electric utilities that could use
their market power to charge excessive rates.90 Each statute appoints an
agency—formerly the Federal Power Commission and Interstate
Commerce Commission, now FERC—to oversee a particular industry
(wholesale electric power, interstate natural gas, or interstate oil
pipeline) to ensure that consumers receive reliable energy service at
reasonable rates.91
Environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
RCRA, and CERCLA exemplify social regulation. They take aim at
pollution and other environmental impacts, which are examples of
classic externalities. Instead of regulating particular industries
comprehensively, environmental statutes tend to address a particular
problem, such as water pollution, across all industries. Instead of direct
market oversight, environmental statutes regulate conduct that generates
externalities, such as burning coal that emits air pollution.
2.

Energy-Environment Interrelationships
Although energy and environmental statutes embody different

87. See Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 711–12 (1981) (reviewing
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980)). In addition to monopoly power,
economic regulation sometimes aims at excessive competition and economic rents. See Joseph P.
Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 403–07
(1997). In addition to externalities, social regulation sometimes aims at the problems of inadequate
information, scarcity, and public goods. Id. at 407–11.
88. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 709.
89. See Tomain & Shapiro, supra note 87, at 403, 407.
90. See supra note 33.
91. See supra notes 48, 53, 54 and accompanying text.
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regulatory orientations—energy law toward economic regulation, and
environmental law toward social regulation—they overlap substantially
in their application due to the environmental effects of energy
production, transportation, and use. Laws have intertwined energy use
and environmental concerns since at least the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, when English monarchs attempted to prohibit the burning of
coal in London due to poor air quality.92
Environmental considerations affect markets. Indeed, that effect,
rooted in the understanding that environmental impacts involve
externalities not reflected in the unregulated market, is the basis for
regulatory intervention to protect the environment. That the natural gas
pipeline has no economic incentive to take into account its effects on
wildlife, for example, justifies laws requiring FERC to weigh those
environmental effects in deciding whether to authorize the pipeline.
Environmental regulation can increase the cost of production for a fuel
source, affecting both the market price and quantity of the fuel
consumed. Whether this distorts or corrects the market depends on the
regulation.
Markets, moreover, affect the environment. Electricity and natural gas
rates influence how much electric power and natural gas consumers use.
Energy use determines how many natural gas wells are drilled and how
much electric power is generated, and consequently how much pollution
is emitted with those activities. The relative economic costs of different
types of energy also affect what energy sources are used. The balance
between coal and natural gas use, for example, which strongly affects air
pollutant emissions, depends in significant part on the relative cost of the
two fuel types. Low natural gas prices in recent years have substantially
reduced air emissions by inducing power companies to use more natural
gas and less coal to generate electricity.93 But low natural gas prices
could also suppress the development of even cleaner energy sources,
such as nuclear and wind.94
3.

Energy-Environment Conflicts
The energy-environment divide harms both energy law and

92. See Peter Brimblecombe & László Makra, Selections from the History of Environmental
Pollution, with Special Attention to Air Pollution. Part 2*: From Medieval Times to the 19th
Century, 23 INT’L J. ENV’T & POLLUTION 351, 355 (2005).
93. Today in Energy: Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions Declined in 2012, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10691#.
94. See Matthew L. Wald, The Potential Downside of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at
B3.
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environmental law. The mere existence of a divide would not necessarily
be problematic. Due to the different orientations of the fields, it seems
rational to separate them and for agencies to specialize. The problem is
that their differing orientations cause conflicts that impede the
effectiveness of each. As noted, energy statutes focus on economic
regulation to make energy widely available to end users at reasonable
cost,95 whereas environmental statutes focus on preventing pollution and
damage to natural resources.96 The goals lead the two fields to work at
cross-purposes, with energy law seeking to keep energy costs low,
stimulating energy use and the harms it causes, while environmental law
has attempted to reduce environmental harms, and in doing so increases
energy costs by regulating emissions from energy production and use.97
The energy-environment divide is not only harmful, it is also
unnecessary. Although the reasons for conflicts between energy law and
environmental law are clear in light of their differing perspectives, the
conflicts are not inherent or inevitable. The monopoly power targeted by
energy statutes and the externalities targeted by environmental statutes
are both forms of market failure because they prevent markets from
allocating resources efficiently.98 A rational regulatory approach
therefore would pursue an efficient market that would be both
competitive and would internalize externalities.99 To the extent that the
two fields conflict, it is because they each pursue their respective goals
blind to the goals of the other.
II.

NEGATIVE CONSTRAINTS EXACERBATE THE ENERGYENVIRONMENT DIVIDE

Part I explained that the differing orientations of energy law and
environmental law have created conflicts between the two fields. These
conflicts arise in part because each field has its own objectives and does
not necessarily consider other objectives. Part II examines the primary
95. See Davies, supra note 11, at 483 (“The dominant energy policy paradigm in the United
States is ample energy supplies at the cheapest price. Energy law indelibly reflects this.”).
96. See LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to
limit ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”).
97. See Davies, supra note 11, at 495.
98. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., NO. PAD-77-34, GOVERNMENT REGULATORY ACTIVITY:
JUSTIFICATIONS, PROCESSES, IMPACTS, AND ALTERNATIVES 6 (1977).
99. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 167–68 (2005) (noting that a single normative criterion, allocative
efficiency, defines a well-functioning market and that there is no inherent conflict “between pursuit
of energy policy goals and environmental regulations”).
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mechanism by which energy law and environmental law have attempted
to manage their divide. To address conflicts, energy and environmental
laws have traditionally adopted requirements that attempt to force
agencies to consider the conflicts their policies create. Part II.A explains
how environmental statutes impose requirements that apply to FERC’s
energy programs. Part II.B then explains how EPA’s environmental
statutes include energy requirements. Part II.C concludes that, although
environmental requirements and energy requirements are intended to
reconcile energy law and environmental law’s divide, they in fact
exacerbate it.
A.

Environmental Requirements in Energy Law

Many of the energy-related activities that FERC licenses, permits, and
regulates under its energy statutes have direct environmental effects.
Hydropower facilities disrupt rivers and streams that provide habitat for
fish and wildlife.100 Activities associated with building and operating oil
and gas pipelines and electricity transmission facilities may emit air
pollutants, discharge water pollutants, fill wetlands, affect coastal zones,
or fragment habitat.101 These environmental effects trigger the
application of federal environmental statutes, including the Clean Air
Act;102 Clean Water Act;103 Coastal Zone Management Act,104 National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),105 and Endangered Species Act
(ESA).106 FERC decisions often address the application of these
environmental statutes.107
100. See, e.g., Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1375–76 (9th
Cir. 1994) (noting that the Columbia River Basin’s hydropower system has contributed to the
decline of salmon and steelhead populations).
101. See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (examining
impacts of pipeline construction on shellfish habitat); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 98 FERC ¶
61,027, 61,076 (2002) (noting air emissions from pipeline compressor stations).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. See Federal Statutes: Environmental, FED. ENERGY REG.
COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta.asp (last updated Apr. 14, 2015) (listing the Federal
Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Coastal Zone Management Act,
ESA, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic
Preservation Act, Rivers and Harbors Act, and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act).
107. See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., 141 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2012) (addressing application
of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and ESA to construction and operation of natural gas
compression, pipeline, and storage facilities); City of Tacoma, Washington, 104 FERC ¶ 61,324
(2003) (addressing application of the Clean Water Act, ESA, and CZMA to relicensing of a
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Clean Air Act section 176 prohibits federal agencies from supporting,
licensing, or permitting any activity that does not conform to an
applicable state implementation plan developed to attain air quality at
levels below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.108 Thus, when
FERC licenses or permits an activity that will result in new air pollutant
emissions, such as the construction and operation of a natural gas
pipeline that will include compressor stations, the agency must
determine whether emissions resulting from the activity will cause air
pollution problems in the areas in which the emissions occur.109
Other environmental statutes also contain environmental
requirements:
 Under Clean Water Act section 401, an applicant for a federal
license or permit to conduct any activity that may result in a
discharge into navigable waters must provide the licensing or
permitting agency with a certification from the relevant state
that the discharge will comply with applicable water quality
standards.110 Thus, FERC cannot issue a hydropower license
under the Federal Power Act unless it receives a water quality
certification (or waiver) from the state.111 State water quality
hydroelectric project); Millennium Pipeline Co., 100 FERC ¶ 61,277 (2002) (addressing application
of the Clean Water Act, ESA, and CZMA to construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7506. The Clean Air Act section 109 directs EPA to establish National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at levels sufficient to protect the public health and welfare. Id.
§ 7409. Each state must develop state implementation plans that allow air quality control regions
within the state to attain the NAAQS. Id. § 7410.
EPA regulations implementing Clean Air Act section 176 require a federal agency to assess, as a
threshold matter, whether its actions will result in “direct and indirect emissions” that exceed certain
specified thresholds. 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b)–(c) (2014). If the emissions exceed the threshold, the
agency must prepare a conformity determination confirming that emissions from the action comply
with all relevant requirements in applicable state implementation plans. Id. § 93.158(c).
109. See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,179 (2013). FERC decisions
addressing compliance with Clean Air Act section 176 have addressed, for example, whether a
licensed facility will have indirect effects that may violate the terms of a state implementation plan,
such as a natural gas pipeline that may lead to emissions from burning the gas transported through
the pipeline. See S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that FERC was not required to account for such emissions because they were not subject to FERC’s
control and because the amount of gas the pipeline would carry was uncertain); Sabine Pass
Liquefaction, LLC, 139 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2012) (same).
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (d) (2012). The requirement is waived if the state does not act on a
request for certification within a reasonable period of time, which shall not exceed one year. See id.
111. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) (holding
that states may condition project certification on any limitations, including minimum flow
requirements, necessary to comply with state water quality standards or other appropriate
requirements of state law); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 143 FERC ¶ 62,102 (2013) (noting
waiver of requirement where state declined to issue certification); Creamer & Noble Energy, Inc.,
92 FERC ¶ 62,076 (2000) (dismissing application for hydropower project license where applicant
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certifications often include limitations and requirements on the
project, which by operation of Clean Water Act section 401
become a condition on FERC’s license.112
Following a structure similar to the water quality certification
under Clean Water Act section 401, the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) requires an applicant for a federal
license or permit authorizing any activity that affects land, water
use, or natural resource of a coastal zone to certify that the
activity is consistent with the applicable state CZMA
management program.113 Thus, when an applicant seeks a FERC
license for an activity within a designated coastal zone, such as a
hydropower project114 or pipeline,115 the CZMA requires the
applicant to obtain a certification of consistency with the
applicable state CZMA management plan.
Pursuant to the ESA, FERC must consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service when the
agency receives an application to license a project that may
affect an endangered species.116

had failed to procure a state water quality certification).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 132 FERC ¶ 62,101 (2010) (accepting a state
temporary water quality certification amendment and incorporating it as a temporary amendment to
the project license). In addition to section 401, FERC-approved projects sometimes implicate Clean
Water Act section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), which requires a permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers to discharge dredge or fill material into waters of the United States. See, e.g.,
Cogeneration, Inc., 76 FERC ¶ 61,193 (1996) (noting that construction of hydropower project
required a § 404 permit); Idaho Power Co., 64 FERC ¶ 62,057 (1993) (noting that relocation of
boating launch area connected to hydropower project required a § 404 permit).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (2012). The state then has six months to notify the federal agency
whether it concurs with or objects to the applicant’s certification of consistency; if the state does not
respond within six months, its concurrence is presumed. Id.
114. See Mountain Rhythm Res. v. FERC, 302 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming FERC’s
dismissal of applications for hydropower license under Federal Power Act where applicant failed to
apply for county Shoreline Management Act permit).
115. See Nw. Pipeline, GP, 145 FERC ¶ 61,013 (2013) (reaffirming FERC’s conditional approval
of certificate of public convenience and necessity, subject to subsequent CZMA consistency
certification from state).
116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring federal agencies to insure, in consultation with the
Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service, that their actions are “not likely to
jeopardize” endangered or threatened species or to destroy or adversely modify critical habitat of
such species); Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., 111 FERC ¶ 62,040 (2005) (temporarily waiving
hydropower license’s minimum stream flow requirements, based on recommendations of Fish and
Wildlife Service, to avoid harm to endangered arroyo toads from excessive water releases); Cent.
Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 14 FERC ¶ 62,009, 63,017 (1981) (amending hydropower
licenses to include conditions agreed upon in consultation with Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure
that project did not jeopardize endangered whooping crane or destroy or adversely modify its
critical habitat).
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NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and to release to the
public an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before taking
any major action “significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.”117 FERC generally applies NEPA to its
decisions that involve the construction, modification, or
operation of physical facilities—for example, authorization to
construct a pipeline under the Natural Gas Act, a hydropower
license under the Federal Power Act, or authorization for new
electric transmission facilities.118
In addition to the environmental requirements that
environmental statutes apply to energy programs, the energy
statutes themselves contain some embedded environmental
provisions. Like environmental statutes, these environmental
provisions embedded in energy statutes operate by imposing
environmental requirements on energy programs.119

ESA section 7 requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of federally listed endangered or threatened species, or destroy or adversely
modify the designated critical habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). When an applicant
for a federal license or permit has reason to believe that an endangered or threatened species may be
present in the area affected by its project and that the project will likely affect such species, ESA
section 7 requires the federal agency to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service or National
Marine Fisheries Service regarding steps that may be necessary to avoid jeopardizing the species.
Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
118. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 380.5, 380.6 (2014) (listing activities that require an EA or EIS). For
these types of decisions, FERC orders frequently address the agency’s compliance with NEPA. See,
e.g., N. Natural Gas Co., 146 FERC ¶ 61194 (2014); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 146 FERC
¶ 61116 (2014); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 146 FERC ¶ 61075 (2014). The agency’s
compliance with NEPA is often contested in litigation challenging FERC orders. See, e.g., S. Coast
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2010); Piedmont Envtl.
Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2009). With respect to decisions that do not
directly involve physical facilities, however, FERC has significantly restricted the scope of its
obligations under NEPA by arguing that many of its decisions do not have environmental impacts
within NEPA’s purview. See 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a). FERC’s NEPA regulations, for example, state
that its decisions approving wholesale electricity rates under the Federal Power Act do not require
an EIS. See id. § 380.4(a)(15). FERC reasons that (1) its authority to approve “just and reasonable”
rates under the Federal Power Act does not allow the agency to consider environmental factors; and
(2) the environmental effects of electricity arise from generating facilities over which the agency
lacks regulatory authority. See Monongahela Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,350 (1987). FERC’s NEPA
regulations codify the agency’s decision in Monongahela Power Co. See Regulations Implementing
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,897, 47,900 (Dec. 17, 1987) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 380).
119. See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (“In deciding whether to issue any
license under this subchapter for any project, the Commission, in addition to the power and
development purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to the purposes
of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational
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Energy Requirements in Environmental Law

Part II.A focused on environmental requirements that apply to FERC
regulatory programs under the traditional energy statutes. A parallel
situation exists within EPA’s jurisdiction under environmental statutes,
where energy requirements frequently apply. Unlike in FERC’s energy
statutes, however, where environmental requirements are primarily
imposed externally by environmental statutes, energy requirements in
EPA’s jurisdiction arise internally from within environmental statutes
themselves. Each of the major federal environmental statutes contain
significant energy requirements.
The Clean Air Act, in authorizing EPA to regulate air pollutant

opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality.”); id. § 10(a), 16
U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (requiring FERC, when issuing a hydropower license, to ensure that the licensed
project is “adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of
water-power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other beneficial public uses,
including irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreational and other purposes referred to in
section 797(e) of this title”); id. § 10(i), 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (“[I]n order to adequately and equitably
protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds
and habitat) affected by the development, operation, and management of the project, each license
issued under this subchapter shall include conditions for such protection, mitigation, and
enhancement . . . based on recommendations received pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) from the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and State fish and wildlife agencies.”). This cluster of three related
provisions in the Federal Power Act explicitly and specifically requires FERC to incorporate
environmental considerations into its decisions regarding hydropower licenses. See generally
Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency
Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81 (2001); J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005). The provisions
especially emphasize protection of fish and wildlife and require FERC to coordinate with federal
and state fish and wildlife agencies to develop conditions to ensure such protection. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 797(e), 803(a)(1), 803(j).
In addition to embedded environmental provisions, federal energy statutes contain provisions that
apply incidentally to environmentally related actions. For example, Federal Power Act section 204
prohibits public utility companies subject to FERC’s jurisdiction from issuing or assuming liability
for securities without authorization from FERC. See 16 U.S.C § 824c. Public utilities often issue
pollution control bonds to finance capital investments in pollution control. When they do so, they
must obtain FERC approval. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 62,166 (2007); El Paso
Elec. Co., 73 FERC ¶ 62,075 (1995). Federal Power Act section 204 applies to many actions by
public utilities that do not involve pollution control bonds. See, e.g., Trans Bay Cable LLC, 129
FERC ¶ 62,110 (2009) (authorizing Trans Bay Cable to issue up to $371 million in securities to
fund a transmission project); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,160, 61,698–99 (2007)
(authorizing the Southwest Power Pool to issue up to $50 million in unsecured promissory notes to
fund various capital expenditures). Even with respect to pollution control bonds, nothing about
FERC’s approval decision gives any weight to the underlying environmental objectives of the
bonds.
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emissions from stationary sources and mobile sources,120 generally does
not prescribe particular emissions limits for such sources, but instead
directs EPA to establish emissions limits based on pollution control
technologies that consider various factors such as emissions, other
environmental impacts, and economic costs.121 The statutory definitions
of the control technologies usually include energy as a factor,122 often
using the term “energy requirements.”123
In addition to references to energy-related factors in the control
technologies it prescribes, the Clean Air Act includes provisions that
require EPA and FERC to coordinate on energy-related environmental
issues. To alleviate the most severe conflicts between pollution control
and energy reliability, Clean Air Act section 110(f) allows the President
to declare a regional energy emergency that exempts fuel-burning
stationary sources of air pollution from some Clean Air Act
requirements.124 In addition, EPA and FERC have coordinated to

120. See Clean Air Act §§ 101–193, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (stationary sources); id. §§ 202–
250, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7590 (mobile sources). See generally supra notes 66–70 and accompanying
text (summarizing the Clean Air Act).
121. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (directing EPA to determine the “best
available control technology” applicable to a new stationary source by considering “energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs”); id. § 169A(b)(2), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7491(b)(2), (g)(2) (directing EPA to determine the “best available retrofit technology” applicable
to “major stationary source” of an air pollutant that contributes to the impairment of visibility by
considering “the costs of compliance, the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of
compliance, any existing pollution control technology in use at the source, the remaining useful life
of the source, and the degree of improvement in visibility which may reasonably be anticipated to
result from the use of such technology”); id. § 183(b), (e)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b), (e)(1)(A)
(directing EPA to determine the “best available controls” applicable to certain stationary sources of
volatile organic compound or PM-10 emissions by considering “technological and economic
feasibility, health, environmental, and energy impacts”); id. § 202(a)(3)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(i)
(directing EPA to establish emissions standards for new vehicles “which reflect the greatest degree
of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator
determines will be available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate
consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such
technology”).
122. See, e.g., id. § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (directing EPA to consider “energy . . . impacts”
in determining the “best available control technology” applicable to a new stationary source in a
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Area); id. § 169A(b)(2), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2),
(g)(2) (directing EPA to consider “energy . . . impacts” in determining the “best available retrofit
technology” applicable to “major stationary source” of an air pollutant that contributes to the
impairment of visibility).
123. Id. § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in
establishing standards of performance for new stationary sources); id. § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d)(2) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in establishing emissions standards
for stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants).
124. Id. § 110(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f).
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develop policies preventing EPA’s Clean Air Act rules from causing
reliability problems due to the shutdown of electric generating units that
cannot comply with EPA’s emissions limits.125
Other environmental statutes also contain energy requirements:
 As with the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act does not itself
establish effluent limits for the pollutant discharges it regulates,
but instead directs EPA to establish limits based on pollution
control technologies that consider various factors such as
effluent reduction benefits, costs, and non-water quality related
environmental impacts.126 Also as in the Clean Air Act, the
statutory definitions of the control technologies usually include

125. See, e.g., Policy Statement on the Commission’s Role Regarding the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, 139 FERC ¶ 61,131 (May 17, 2012);
Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Enforcement Response Policy for Use of Clean
Air Act Section 113(a) Administrative Orders in Relation to Electric Reliability and the Mercury
and
Air
Toxics
Standard
(Dec.
16,
2011),
available
at
http://www3.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/EnforcementResponsePolicyforCAA113.pdf; see also Bobby
McMahon, Clark Calls for FERC to Certify EPA Compliance Plan as All Commissioners Back
‘Safety Valve,’ INSIDE FERC, Sept. 15, 2014, at 1 (describing discussion among FERC
commissioners about employing a similar policy under EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan).
126. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012) (directing EPA
to determine the “best practicable control technology” applicable to an existing direct discharger by
considering “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits
to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of equipment and
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types
of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy
requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 304(b)(2)(B),
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (directing EPA to determine the “best available technology” applicable
to an existing direct discharger of toxic or non-conventional pollutants by considering “the age of
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application
of various types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B)
(directing EPA to determine the “best conventional pollutant control technology” applicable to an
existing direct discharger of conventional pollutants by considering “the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction
benefits derived, and the comparison of the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from the
discharge from publicly owned treatment works to the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants
from a class or category of industrial sources, and shall take into account the age of equipment and
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types
of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy
requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 306(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to determine the “best available
demonstrated control technology” for new sources based on consideration of “the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction, and any non-water quality, environmental impact and energy
requirements”).
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“energy requirements” as a factor.127
Since 1980, RCRA, which regulates the management of
hazardous wastes, has exempted “drilling fluids, produced
waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration,
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or
geothermal energy” from regulation as hazardous wastes.128
Congress enacted the exemption based on its concern that
regulating such wastes under RCRA “could have a significant
economic impact on domestic oil and gas exploration and
production activities.”129

127. See, e.g., id. § 304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(43)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B),
(b)(4)(B) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in establishing effluent limitation
guidelines for sources and pollutants under the best practicable control technology standard, best
available control technology standard, and best conventional pollutant control technology,
respectively).
128. RCRA § 3001(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2). Because RCRA’s stringent requirements for
managing hazardous waste contrast with the comparatively lenient regulatory requirements for nonhazardous solid waste, see Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 4001–4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a,
much rides on the classification of waste as hazardous or non-hazardous. See, e.g., Am. Chemistry
Council v. EPA, 337 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Metal Trades, Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp.
689 (D.S.C. 1992); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. EPA, 846 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994) (noting that hazardous wastes are
subject to “rigorous safeguards and waste management procedures,” whereas “[n]onhazardous
wastes are regulated much more loosely”). RCRA’s definition of hazardous waste cuts broadly,
directing EPA to identify wastes as hazardous based on their “toxicity, persistence, and
degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as
flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics.” RCRA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(a). Pursuant to this authority, EPA has promulgated detailed regulations listing specific
wastes as categorically hazardous and identifying characteristics by which to classify additional
wastes as hazardous. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20–32 (2014).
129. S. REP. NO. 96-172, at 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5025. Congress
enacted this Bentsen Amendment, named after Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, as part of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 7, 94 Stat. 2334, 2336. The
Amendment itself only precluded EPA from regulating exploration and production wastes as
hazardous until the agency had studied their effects on human health and the environment,
submitted a report to Congress, and made a determination whether regulating such wastes under
RCRA was warranted. RCRA §§ 3001(b)(2), 8002(m), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(b), 6982(m). EPA issued
its report in 1987. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF
WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL
GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987). In 1988, EPA issued a regulatory determination that
regulating exploration and production wastes under RCRA is not warranted. Regulatory
Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development, and Production Wastes,
53 Fed. Reg. 25,446 (July 6, 1988). Thus, exploration and production wastes remain exempt from
RCRA by EPA action. In September 2010, the Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned EPA
to regulate exploration and production wastes as hazardous wastes under RCRA. See Letter from
Amy Mall, Senior Policy Analyst, NRDC, to the Honorable Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 8,
2010), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_10091301a.pdf. The EPA, cognizant of the
political fallout that would result, seems unlikely to grant the petition See Jeffrey M. Gaba,
Flowback: Federal Regulation of Wastewater from Hydraulic Fracturing, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
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CERCLA, which imposes strict liability on anyone who
contributes—from
generation
through
disposal—to
contamination caused by a “release, or threatened release,” of a
“hazardous substance”130—excludes petroleum.131 CERCLA’s
legislative history is infamously sparse and opaque, but
Congress appears to have enacted the petroleum exclusion, as
with RCRA’s Bentsen Amendment, to avoid economic impacts
on the oil and gas industry.132
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),133 which directs EPA
and states to regulate “underground injection” of contaminants
that endanger drinking water sources,134 contains two
exclusions, both energy-related. The SDWA excludes
“underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage,”
and “underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other
than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”135 The
SDWA includes an additional exemption that precludes EPA
from issuing regulations that interfere with underground
injection of oil and gas production fluids or underground
injection for secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or natural gas,
unless EPA finds that such regulation would be “essential to
assure that underground sources of drinking water will not be
endangered by such injection.”136

251, 279 n.133 (2014) (opining that “it will be a cold day in hell before EPA elects to list oil and gas
wastes as hazardous”).
130. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
131. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (“The term ‘hazardous substance’ . . . does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically
listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this
paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).”).
132. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and
Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 98 n.105 (1994) (“CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion cannot be justified
by any health or environmental concern. It was probably included as a political expediency to
secure the necessary votes from oil producing states.”).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26.
134. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1421, 42 U.S.C. § 300h. The SDWA prescribes
national drinking water regulations that contain maximum contaminant levels to protect public
health. Id. § 1412, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1.
135. Id. § 1421(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1).
136. Id. § 1421(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2).
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Exacerbating the Energy-Environment Divide

This Part’s descriptions of environmental requirements that apply to
FERC and energy requirements that apply to EPA may on first thought
seem to undermine Part I’s argument that an energy-environment divide
exists. After all, as the examples in this Part show, FERC administers its
energy statutes subject to significant environmental responsibilities, and
EPA administers its environmental statutes subject to significant energy
responsibilities.
The idea of an energy-environment divide was never, however,
premised on a complete separation of the two fields. Energy policy and
environmental policy have long overlapped in application.137 The divide
between energy law and environmental law exists not through separation
in their application, but by virtue of their conflicting orientations. And
this highlights the paradox of these environmental and energy
requirements: although the environmental requirements that apply to
FERC and the energy requirements that apply to EPA embody an
overlap between energy law and environmental law, they actually
exacerbate the energy-environment divide.
To see how the overlap of energy law and environmental law tends to
exacerbate the energy-environment divide, consider the role of
environmental requirements in FERC’s energy programs and the role of
energy requirements in EPA’s environmental programs. In either
situation, the applicable environmental requirement or energy
requirement acts as a negative constraint on the primary goal of the
program. The ESA may, for example, compel FERC to impose
limitations on the operation of a hydroelectric project.138 Similarly, the
Safe Drinking Water Act’s exemption for hydraulic fracturing fluids
limits EPA’s ability to regulate the underground injection of such
fluids.139
The environmental statutes that apply to FERC impose requirements
on FERC, and frame those requirements in the negative as limitations on
the agency’s authority to pursue its objectives under the Federal Power
Act and other energy statutes. This places FERC in the position of a

137. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that, during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, English monarchs attempted to prohibit burning coal in London due to poor air quality).
138. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 979 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding FERC order
requiring public utility, pursuant to ESA, to increase the flow of water in the river below its
hydroelectric dam to reduce the dam’s impact on endangered tulotoma snails).
139. SDWA § 1421(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1).
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regulated entity that must comply with another agency’s requirements,140
rather than in the position of a regulator that creates and enforces the
requirements. In other words, environmental statutes make FERC a
subject, rather than an agent, of their programs. Imposing negative
constraints on energy programs also signals that environmental
protection is something different, and apart from, energy policy
objectives. Whatever the merits of this structure, it inevitably deepens
the operational divide between the energy statutes that empower FERC
and the environmental statutes that constrain it.
A similar divide exists between the environmental statutes that
empower EPA to regulate and the energy requirements contained within
those statutes that constrain the agency’s regulatory authority. This
structure by its very nature sets energy and the environment in
opposition. It also impairs the efficacy of energy requirements and
environmental requirements, as agencies generally will be inclined to
pursue their primary mission and minimize competing requirements.141
FERC’s policies, moreover, have accentuated the divide between its
energy and environmental regulatory spheres. The agency interprets
great swathes of its economic regulatory authority under the energy
statutes to exclude environmental considerations. For example, FERC
traditionally has taken the position that the “just and reasonable”
standard under the Federal Power Act encompasses solely economic and
not environmental considerations.142 When FERC does acknowledge a
role for environmental factors in its decisions, such as when the agency
authorizes construction of a new pipeline, it largely shunts its
environmental analysis into a separate analysis, often under the rubric of
NEPA. Although theoretically it makes sense to consolidate
environmental analyses into NEPA’s comprehensive framework, in
practice this can marginalize environmental factors and emphasize the

140. The environmental statutes that apply to FERC are primarily administered by other
agencies—most notably EPA (Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act), but also the Fish and Wildlife
Service and National Marine Fisheries Service (ESA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s Office of Ocean and CZMA. NEPA provides the notable exception. Although the
White House Council on Environmental Quality coordinates NEPA policy and implementation,
administration of the statute is largely left to each agency. See James J. Hoecker, The NEPA
Mandate and Federal Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry, 13 ENERGY L.J. 265, 275 (1992).
141. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department
of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 308 (2013); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 119, at 2221.
142. See, e.g., Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(affirming PSI Energy, Inc., 55 FERC ¶ 61,254, 61,811 (1991), and concluding that “potential
siting, health, safety, environmental or archeological problems are beyond the Commission’s
authority to consider under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act”).
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energy-environment divide.143 Indeed, as an example of this, FERC
often issues one order conditionally approving a new gas pipeline under
the Natural Gas Act based on “non-environmental” factors and then a
later order finalizing the approval based on subsequent environmental
reviews.144
EPA’s energy requirements seem similarly limited in effect. When
issuing regulations pursuant to statutory provisions that include energy
requirements, EPA frequently notes that it has considered energy
impacts in selecting the appropriate control technology. 145 But EPA
seldom, if ever, alters its selection of a control technology based on
energy impacts. Thus, the peripheral roles of environmental
requirements in energy law and of energy requirements in environmental
law exacerbate the energy-environment divide.
III.

POLICY ALIGNMENTS BRIDGE THE ENERGYENVIRONMENT DIVIDE

This Part proposes the use of a different model, policy alignments, to
bridge the energy-environment divide. Part I and Part II portray a
somewhat dysfunctional relationship between energy law and
environmental law. Energy statutes seem narrow and unresponsive to
environmental concerns. Environmental statutes seem ineffectual and
marginalized as applied to energy issues. Making matters worse, the
overlap between the two fields is managed primarily by requirements
that attempt to impose negative environmental requirements on energy
programs and negative energy requirements on environmental programs.
It seems clear that this existing divide in law departs dramatically from
143. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (noting critiques
of “the temporal and functional gulf that separates the ritualized procedures of EIS production from
agencies’ real decision making processes”).
144. See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 100 FERC ¶ 61,311 (2002) (issuing conditional
certificate of public convenience and necessity for construction and operation of gas pipeline and
associated facilities); Alliance Pipeline L.P., 80 FERC ¶ 61,149 (1997) (same); Wyo.-Cal. Pipeline
Co., 45 FERC ¶ 61,353 (1988) (same).
145. See Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans: Arizona; Regional Haze and
Interstate Visibility Transport Federal Implementation Plan, 79 Fed. Reg. 52,420, 52,443 (Sept. 3,
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (concluding that the agency’s proposed option for
controlling air emissions from a copper smelter entailed energy requirements that would be
“reasonable given the significant emission reductions and associated visibility benefits”); Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Airport Deicing Category,
77 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,196–97 (May 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 9, 449)
(summarizing the energy requirements associated with regulatory options for controlling water
pollutant discharges associated with airport deicing).
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the close factual interrelationship that exists between energy and the
environment.
Responding to this dysfunction, some scholars have attacked the legal
separation between economic regulation and environmental regulation,
arguing in favor of merging energy law and environmental law to undo
the harmful effects of the environmental-energy divide.146 It is unclear,
however, what a merger would entail, either doctrinally, institutionally,
or politically. A full integration of energy and environmental regulation
would necessitate significant changes to existing laws, policies, and
institutions. Such changes would face enormous obstacles. FERC, for
example, has spent decades carefully cabining its regulatory authority to
focus on economic regulation, with considerable success in the courts.147
Broadening FERC’s authority to encompass externalities and other
market failures, as some have advocated,148 would fundamentally reorient the agency in ways that would likely generate significant
opposition from both inside and outside the agency—and perhaps from
courts as well. In light of these problems, it would be beneficial to
identify alternative means of addressing the energy-environment divide.
Convergence, however, does not necessarily entail merger into a
unified whole. Convergence also can occur through the development of
similar and compatible characteristics in systems that otherwise maintain
independence, in the process accomplishing reconciliation through
alignment rather than merger. An alignment-based strategy could thus
bridge the energy-environment divide by aligning federal energy policy
and federal environmental policy without merging the regulatory
programs of FERC and EPA.149
146. See, e.g., Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 383–88 (2011) (proposing an integration of
energy and environmental law); Davies, supra note 11, at 504 (advocating a “marriage” that would
result in “a merged body of energy-environmental law”).
147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting FERC’s position that the “just and
reasonable” standard under the Federal Power Act encompasses solely economic and not
environmental considerations).
148. See Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the
Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 329–30 (2014) (arguing that FERC can issue
regulations that internalize externalities from carbon emissions in wholesale electricity sales);
Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation, 2 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 112 n.199 (2012) (proposing that FERC could reinterpret the Federal
Power Act “to include environmental externalities in determining when rates are just and
reasonable”); 2 STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT
LEGISLATION § 3.2 (2014) (contending that Federal Power Act section 205, which authorizes FERC
to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of the wholesale electricity market, gives the agency
authority to include a “carbon adder” in wholesale electricity rates).
149. See Klass, supra note 11, at 189–200 (examining state initiatives to mitigate climate change
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The remainder of this Part explores the use of policy alignments to
manage the energy-environment relationship. Part III.A identifies four
recent examples of policies FERC has adopted, pursuant to traditional
authority over wholesale electric power rates under the Federal Power
Act, that align with environmental objectives. Part III.B highlights two
examples, one from the 1990s and one very recent, in which EPA, acting
pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act, adopts policies that
align with energy objectives. Part III.C examines the implications of
using policy alignments to address the energy-environment divide.
A.

Energy Policies that Align with Environmental Objectives

When Congress enacted the Federal Power Act in 1935, the electric
power industry was dominated by vertically integrated utilities that
owned and operated their own power plants, transmission lines, and
local distribution systems.150 Under both the Federal Power Act and state
regulation, electric utilities exercised government-protected monopoly
power, in exchange for incurring certain obligations with respect to
customers in their service areas.151 The utilities’ customers paid a single
charge that included all the costs associated with providing power—
generation, transmission, and distribution.152 Economies of scale in
power generation led utilities to rely on large, centralized power
plants.153
Dramatic changes spurred by economic, legal, and technological
factors have moved the electric power sector away from this traditional
model.154 Rising petroleum prices, inflation, and new environmental
through energy policy, and in doing so highlighting ways in which policies can create linkages
between energy law and environmental law without a convergence of the two fields).
150. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (“In 1935, when the FPA became law, most
electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their own power plants,
transmission lines, and local delivery systems.”).
151. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1339, 1349 (2010) (summarizing this “regulatory compact”); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and
Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 438 (2002) (“Traditional utilities were immune
from competition in their monopoly protected service areas . . . .”).
152. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5 (noting that electricity sales were “bundled”).
153. See Peter C. Carstensen, Creating Workably Competitive Wholesale Markets in Energy:
Necessary Conditions, Structure, and Conduct, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 91 (2005)
(“In the case of production of electricity, the conventional wisdom up to the 1970s was that there
were economies of scale as generation facilities got larger and larger.”); Peter Navarro, A
Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347,
350 (1995) (noting that, for the first fifty years of regulation of the electric power industry,
“[u]tilities built ever larger and larger power plants to capture economies of scale”).
154. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5 (noting “dramatic changes in the power industry that have
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regulations changed the cost structure of electric power generation,
upsetting settled expectations of stable rates and economies of scale.155
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),156 which
required utilities to purchase power from “qualifying facilities” at rates
that turned out to be quite favorable to the facilities,157 enabled and
incentivized independent generators to enter the market. 158
Technological developments allowed the creation of large interstate
electric power networks, or “grids,” that have enabled utilities to
transmit electricity over long distances at relatively low costs.159
Although certainly not the only contributor, FERC has been a key
driver of the transformation of the electric power industry. In 1996,
FERC issued its landmark Order 888, which required public utilities to
provide non-discriminatory open access transmission services,160
effectively breaking utilities’ monopoly control of the interstate
transmission market. As the legal basis for Order 888, FERC cited its
longstanding authority under Federal Power Act section 206 to ensure
that wholesale electric power rates are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.161
Since 1996, FERC has continued to take actions aimed at bringing

occurred in recent decades”); Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in
the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 119 (1997) (noting “dramatic changes” in the
electric power sector); Jonas Monast & David Hoppock, Designing CO2 Performance Standards for
a Transitioning Electricity Sector: A Multi-Benefits Framework, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 11068, 11069 (2014) (“A number of market, regulatory, and technological factors
occurring in a relatively short time frame are resulting in dramatic changes throughout the
electricity sector . . . .”).
155. See Navarro, supra note 153, at 350; Tomain, supra note 151, at 450.
156. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
157. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012).
158. See Navarro, supra note 153, at 351; Tomain, supra note 151, at 451–53.
159. See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 7–8 (describing the development of interconnected electric
power networks).
160. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888].
161. Id. at 21,560 (“[W]e conclude that we have ample legal authority—indeed, a
responsibility—under section 206 of the FPA [16 U.S.C. § 824e] to order the filing of nondiscriminatory open access transmission tariffs if we find such order necessary as a remedy for
undue discrimination or anticompetitive effects.”). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 had authorized
FERC to issue orders to individual utilities requiring them to provide transmission services to
unaffiliated wholesale generators. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k. With Order 888, FERC applied the
rationale for such orders to the entire industry, undertaking “a marketwide remedy for a marketwide
problem.” New York, 535 U.S. at 14.
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competition to wholesale power markets.162 These legal developments
have coincided with other technical and economic innovations that have
moved the electric power industry away from vertically integrated
monopolies and towards the development of smaller, less centralized
power services.163 Some of these power services will comprise what has
become known as the Smart Grid—”a radically upgraded national
electric network” that will “provid[e] consumers with dramatic new
ways to make, use, and conserve electricity.”164 In addition to its
economic implications for the power sector,165 this new wave of power
services has potentially significant environmental ramifications.166 This
section summarizes four FERC regulatory initiatives that, although
founded on the agency’s traditional economic ratemaking authority
under the Federal Power Act, have the potential to produce substantial
environmental benefits from the energy sector.
1.

Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation

Congestion in electricity transmission systems poses a significant and
recurring challenge to efforts to maintain an electric grid that meets
current and evolving energy needs. Transmission congestion leads to
imbalances between supply and demand that increase the price of
electricity and threaten grid reliability.167 These imbalances also can
allow transmission owners and generators to exercise market power that
undermines competition.168 In addition, inadequate transmission capacity
hinders the development of new renewable energy generation resources.
Renewable energy development often depends on transmission

162. See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg.
49,846, 49,847 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2003] (“The
Commission continues to work to encourage fully competitive bulk power markets.”).
163. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191 (“Where the electric industry was once primarily the
domain of vertically integrated utilities generating power at large centralized plants, advances in
technology have created a burgeoning market for small power plants . . . .”).
164. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2013).
165. See Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (noting “a wave of innovation in energy markets that
manifests as disruptive competition for electric utilities”).
166. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191 (noting that new technologies “may offer economic,
reliability, or environmental benefits”).
167. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY vii
(2009).
168. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and
Competition in Electricity, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 931–32 (2013).
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connecting generation-favorable areas, such as the wind corridor that
runs north-south through the central United States, to heavily populated
metropolitan areas that would use the renewable-generated power.169
Recognizing the challenge that transmission congestion poses, FERC
has acted to induce more effective transmission planning. In 2007,
FERC issued Order 890,170 which required transmission providers to
develop a transmission planning process that satisfies nine specified
principles.171 FERC hoped that enhanced transmission planning would
promote increased competition in wholesale electricity markets, leading
to just and reasonable rates.172
By 2010, however, FERC concluded that, although Order 890’s
transmission planning mandate had spurred significant transmission
planning efforts, more was needed to ensure that transmission planning
would be efficient and cost-effective.173 Accordingly, in 2011, FERC
issued Order 1000,174 which has generated considerable excitement175 as
well as controversy176 and undeniably represents an important

169. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811–12 (2012).
170. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg.
12,266 (Feb. 16, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37) [hereinafter Order 890].
171. The nine transmission planning principles Order 890 requires are: (1) coordination; (2)
openness; (3) transparency; (4) information exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; (7)
regional participation; (8) economic planning studies; and (9) cost allocation for new projects. See
generally id.
172. Order 890, supra note 170, at 12,266.
173. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,884, 37,889 (proposed June 30, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35).
174. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order
1000].
175. See Adam James & Whitney Allen, FERC Order 1000: The Most Exciting Energy
Regulation You’ve Never Heard of, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Oct. 22, 2012, 11:30 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/10/22/1059091/ferc-order-1000-the-most-exciting-energyregulation-youve-never-heard-of/; Kevin Jones & Colin Beckman, FERC’s Order 1000 Seeks to
Overhaul Electricity Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, VERMONT LAW TOP 10
ENVIRONMENTAL WATCH LIST 2012, http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu/bonus-ferc-transmissionrules/ (describing Order 1000 as “an ambitious new policy that aims to accomplish two sizable goals
simultaneously”).
176. Numerous parties, including state regulatory agencies, electric transmission providers,
regional transmission organizations, and industry trade associations, petitioned for review of Order
1000 in the D.C. Circuit. In August 2014, the D.C. Circuit unanimously upheld Order 1000 against
the petitioners’ challenges, holding that Order 1000 is consistent with FERC’s authority under the
Federal Power Act and that the agency acted reasonably in issuing Order 1000. See S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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development in U.S. energy policy.177
Order 1000, issued pursuant to Federal Power Act section 206,178
requires four specific changes to transmission planning and cost
allocation: regional transmission planning, elimination of a federal right
of first refusal, coordinated interregional transmission planning, and cost
allocation. First, Order 1000 strengthens Order 890’s requirements for
regional transmission planning.179 Order 1000 requires that regional
transmission planning processes must evaluate transmission alternatives
at the regional, not just local, level;180 to give comparable consideration
to transmission and non-transmission alternatives;181 and to consider
state and federal Public Policy Requirements that affect transmission
needs.182 Second, Order 1000 eliminates a federal right of first refusal to
transmission facilities.183 Third, Order 1000 requires public utility
177. See Emily Holden, FERC Hears Slew of Order No. 1000 Complaints, CQ ROLL CALL (Aug.
22, 2013), available at 2013 WL 4477061 (referring to Order 1000 as a “landmark” regulation);
FERC Order 1000-A Challenge for State PUCs, 4033 PUR UTIL. REG. NEWS, Aug. 19, 2011, at 1
(same).
178. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). Section 206 empowers FERC to “determine the just and
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract” affecting a “rate,
charge, or classification” by a public utility for transmission or sale of electricity within FERC’s
jurisdiction. Id.
179. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,845, 49,854–80.
180. Id. at 49,845; see also id. at 49,867 (noting that Order 890 allowed regional transmission
planning that merely confirmed that local transmission plans within a region did not conflict with
each other). FERC noted that examining alternatives at the regional level expands the range of
alternatives that can be considered, which can lead transmission providers to identify options that
may resolve transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than the narrower range of
solutions identified at the local level. Id. at 49,856. For example, transmission facilities that span the
service territories of multiple local providers may meet transmission needs more efficiently than if
each local provider plans and constructs its own facilities. Id. at 49,857.
181. Id. at 49,869.
182. Id. at 49,876. Regional planning must affirmatively consider how Public Policy
Requirements may affect future transmission needs, and evaluate solutions for meeting those needs.
Id. at 49,877. FERC defined Public Policy Requirements broadly to include any regulation that
drives transmission needs. Id. at 49,878. FERC Order 1000-A subsequently clarified that Public
Policy Requirements include local, as well as state and federal, regulations that drive transmission
needs. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,234 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter
Order 1000-A].
183. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,845. Prior regulations allowed incumbent transmission
developers to hold rights of first refusal to construct new transmission facilities within their service
territories. Id. at 49,880–81. FERC concluded that such rights of first refusal gave an undue
preference to incumbent transmission providers over non-incumbent transmission providers,
creating barriers to entry that potentially increase the cost of developing new transmission facilities.
Id. at 49,886. Order 1000 eliminates the right of first refusal only for transmission facilities
developed through regional planning; it leaves intact, for example, a public utility’s ability to build
new transmission facilities within its own retail distribution service territory—provided the facilities
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transmission providers to coordinate their transmission planning
interregionally.184 Fourth, Order 1000 requires public utility transmission
providers to adopt cost allocation methods for new transmission
facilities selected in a regional transmission plan or through interregional
transmission planning.185
Transmission planning, and Order 1000’s requirements in particular,
have important environmental implications, especially for the
development of renewable energy. Renewable energy poses particular
challenges for transmission because the best sites for renewable energy
projects are often located far from urban and suburban areas, where
electricity demand is centered.186 New transmission facilities are then
needed to connect renewable energy projects to population centers.187 By
facilitating transmission planning, especially across broader areas, Order
1000 should reduce the obstacles to renewable energy development.188
Order 1000 also should make transmission planning more responsive to
renewable portfolio standards and state laws that require certain
percentages of power to come from renewable energy sources.189
Renewable portfolio standards are an example of Public Policy
Requirements that must be considered in regional transmission planning
under Order 1000.190
Order 1000 also has important ramifications for energy efficiency and
demand response. Energy efficiency and demand response, both of
are not submitted for regional cost allocation. Id. at 49,887. FERC has subsequently clarified, and to
some extent limited, Order 1000’s elimination of rights of first refusal. See Order 1000-A, supra
note 182, at 32,249–52.
184. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,846, 49,900–18. FERC concluded that, just as local
transmission planning can neglect more efficient and cost-effective regional alternatives, see supra
note 180 and accompanying text, regional transmission planning can overlook more efficient and
cost-effective interregional alternatives, Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,901. To facilitate
interregional planning, Order 1000 requires transmission providers to create interregional planning
processes and to exchange data and information across neighboring regions, with the goal of
identifying and evaluating potential interregional transmission facilities. Id.
185. Id. at 49,846. These methods must allocate costs in rough proportion to benefits received—
thus, a transmission provider may not allocate costs of a new transmission facility to someone who
does not benefit from the facility. Id. Benefits of new transmission include, but are not limited to,
reliability, cost savings, congestion relief, and meeting Public Policy Requirements. Id. at 49,937.
186. See Shelley Welton & Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 as a New Tool for Promoting
Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,025, 11,026–27
(2012).
187. Id. at 11,027.
188. Id.
189. Sharon Buccino, Smart from the Start - Good Planning Promises Sustainable Energy
Future, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 369, 381 (2012).
190. Id.; Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 275 (2012).
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which reduce demand for electric power, have the potential to reduce the
need for additional transmission facilities.191 Energy efficiency and
demand response therefore fall within the category of what Order 1000
refers to as “non-transmission alternatives.”192 FERC’s direction that
regional transmission planning processes must give comparable
consideration to transmission and non-transmission alternatives has the
potential to stimulate the development of energy efficiency and demand
response, with consequential environmental benefits.193
Numerous nonprofit environmental advocacy organizations—for
example, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Defense Fund,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Clean Air Council, and
Earthjustice—commented during FERC’s rulemaking process for Order
1000.194 Environmental advocates argued in favor of, for example,
including non-transmission alternatives,195 public participation,196 and
explicit consideration of environmental benefits197 in transmission
planning.
FERC did not cite environmental protection as a direct policy
justification for Order 1000, despite the significant environmental
implications of the Order and the arguments of environmental advocates
citing Order 1000’s beneficial environmental consequences. Instead,
FERC hewed closely to the language of Federal Power Act section 206,
repeatedly tying its determinations to findings that the transmission
planning and cost allocation requirements it was imposing would
“ensure that Commission-jurisdictional transmission services are
provided at just and reasonable rates and on a basis that is just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.”198
Environmental policy objectives did, however, provide an indirect policy
justification for Order 1000, insofar as Order 1000 effectuates federal
and state policies—what it calls Public Policy Requirements—some of
which are explicitly environmental.199 But Order 1000 does not actually
191. Welton & Gerrad, supra note 186, at 11,027.
192. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,869.
193. See Welton & Gerrard, supra note 186, at 11,027–28 (noting how Order 1000’s mandate to
consider non-transmission alternatives has the potential to stimulate energy efficiency and demandsize measures, but raising questions about whether Order 1000 will effectively place transmission
and non-transmission alternatives on equal footing).
194. See Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,865, 49,873, 49,967.
195. See id. at 49,865.
196. See id. at 49,866.
197. See id. at 49,946.
198. Id. at 49,842.
199. See Stein, supra note 190, at 275 (noting that the term Public Policy Requirements “is broad
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adopt or internalize the objectives underlying the Public Policy
Requirements—indeed, FERC declined even to define exactly what
policy objectives Public Policy Requirements encompass.200 Instead,
Order 1000 just accepts those Public Policy Requirements as given.
2.

Demand Response

Demand response refers to reductions in electric energy
consumption—nicknamed “negawatts”—in response to an increase in
price or to incentive payments.201 These demand reductions can
substitute for additional electricity generation that otherwise would be
required to meet demand.202 Demand response can include load-shifting
measures, which transfer energy usage from relatively high-cost periods
to lower-cost periods, and load-reducing measures, which reduce net
energy usage.203 Demand response can be especially useful to help the
grid match supply and demand during peak periods, when heavy load
stresses the grid and causes wholesale electricity spot prices to spike.204
In recent years, FERC has issued a series of orders that facilitate
development and integration of demand response resources into
wholesale power markets. Demand response can thus bid into the supply
side of wholesale power markets, competing with electricity generation
as a means of meeting demand. The two most significant of FERC’s
demand response orders, Order 719 (2008)205 and Order 745 (2011),206
enough to encompass a large range of federal interests that can include environmental priorities”).
To be clear, Public Policy Requirements include, but are not limited to, environmental policies.
Moreover, some Public Policy Requirements, such as renewable energy portfolio standards, may
have justifications that include, but are not limited to, environmental protection. See Davies, supra
note 151, at 1358 (noting “wide-ranging rationales” for renewable portfolio standards).
200. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,878.
201. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order
745, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 104 (2012) (“Negawatt is a term that is sometimes
used to equate a unit of electricity saved to a unit consumed, i.e., a megawatt conserved.”).
202. See John C. Hilke, Comments on Peter Carstensen’s “Creating Workably Competitive
Wholesale Markets in Energy,” 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 155, 166 (2005) (noting that
demand response “effectively converts many customers into potential suppliers of ‘negawatts’—
reduced consumption that can substitute for generation”).
203. See BRANDON DAVITO ET AL., THE SMART GRID AND THE PROMISE OF DEMAND-SIDE
MANAGEMENT 38–39 (2010).
204. Cf. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE &
ADVANCED METERING 5 (2008), [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE], available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/demand-response.pdf (stating that demand response is
“centered on critical hours during a day or year when demand is high or when reserve margins are
low”).
205. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100
(Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28) [hereinafter Order 719].
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essentially directed wholesale market system operators—Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators
(ISOs)207—to treat demand response resources more like electric power
generators.208 In short, Order 719 and Order 745 require RTOs and ISOs
to treat negawatts more like megawatts.
Order 719 did not aim exclusively at demand response, but instituted
a series of measures, which FERC intended to increase competition in
organized wholesale electric power markets.209 Many of the measures,
however, either focus specifically on demand response or benefit
demand response.210 The most important of these measures require
RTOs and ISOs to permit demand response resources to bid directly into
organized wholesale energy markets211 and competitive markets for
ancillary services.212 FERC reasoned that enabling demand response to
206. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg.
16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 745].
207. RTOs and ISOs regionally coordinate planning, operation, and use of the electric
transmission grid. Guide to Market Oversight: Glossary, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION,
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2015); see also 18
C.F.R. § 35.34 (2015) (governing RTOs).
208. In addition to the broad policy directives contained in Order 719 and Order 745, FERC has
issued orders regarding the measurement and verification of demand response in organized
wholesale power markets. See Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for
Public Utilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,654 (Mar. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 38) [hereinafter
Order 676-G]; Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities,
75 Fed. Reg. 20,901 (Apr. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 38) [hereinafter Order 676-F].
FERC also has issued narrower orders addressing demand response in specific markets. See, e.g.,
Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,103; Demand Response Supporters, 145 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2013);
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 137 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2011); PJM Interconnection, 146
FERC ¶ 61,052 (2014).
209. Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,100. Order 719 also imposes other requirements on RTOs
and ISOs. They must allow demand response resources to specify limits on the number of hours,
number of times per day, and amount of electric energy reduction they are bidding in the ancillary
services market. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i)(B). They may not assess charges on electric power
purchasers for reducing their purchases during times of shortage or during periods of load
reductions to avoid a shortage. Id. § 35.28(g)(1)(ii). They must allow prices to rebalance supply and
demand during periods of operating reserve shortage. Id. § 35.28(g)(1)(iv). They must provide a
Web-based platform for market participants to offer to buy or sell power on a long-term basis. Id.
§ 35.28(g)(2). They must take measures to increase the effectiveness of their Market Monitoring
Units. Id. § 35.28(g)(3). They must release their offer and bid data. Id. § 35.28(g)(5). They must
adopt practices and procedures to make their boards of directors responsive to customers and other
stakeholders. Id. § 35.28(g)(6).
210. See Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,100 (noting demand response as an area addressed by
Order 719).
211. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(iii). An organized wholesale energy market is a competitive dayahead and/or real-time market. Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,101.
212. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i)(A). FERC defines ancillary services as “[t]hose services
necessary to support the transmission of electric power from seller to purchaser, given the
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participate more effectively in power markets increases competition in
those markets, promoting just and reasonable rates.213
Unlike Order 719, Order 745 focuses on demand response, and
specifically on the compensation paid to demand response resources that
participate in wholesale energy markets. Building on Order 719, which
required RTOs and ISOs to allow demand response resources to
participate in organized wholesale energy markets, Order 745 requires
RTOs and ISOs to pay demand response resources the market price for
energy—that is, the same price received by generators selling power into
wholesale markets.214
Because demand response reduces or redistributes consumption (and
therefore generation) of electric power, it has potentially significant
environmental effects. Several nonprofit environmental organizations
commenting on FERC’s proposed rules argued that demand response
creates important environmental benefits by displacing fossil fuelcombusting electricity generation, either directly by reducing overall
demand215 or indirectly by facilitating the integration of variable
renewable resources such as wind and solar into the grid.216 Some
energy law scholars have similarly argued that demand response can
“reduc[e] greenhouse gas emissions and the need for constructing new
power plants.”217
Generator-affiliated commenters, on the other hand, argued that
incentivizing demand response would lead power customers to reduce
their purchases of grid power by increasing their use of off-grid power,
for example from on-site diesel generators. These off-grid power sources

obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those control areas, to maintain reliable
operations of the interconnected transmission system.” Guide to Market Oversight: Glossary, supra
note 207.
213. Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,101.
214. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v). See generally Joel Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?:
FERC’s Authority over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2013) Eisen’s Article offers legal and policy justifications for
Order 745. Richard Pierce, by contrast, has expressed skepticism about Order 745, including its
ability to effectively internalize the environmental externalities associated with electric power
generation. See Pierce, supra note 201, at 107. But see id. at 109 (nevertheless concluding that
Order 745 “offers the prospect of some marginal improvement in the performance of U.S. electricity
markets”).
215. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,664 (noting comments on the uninternalized environmental
externalities that result from fossil fuel generated electricity as compared with demand response).
216. See Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,104 (“Public Interest Organizations assert that the
presence of demand response in these markets will mitigate the exercise of market power and allow
large amounts of variable resources (e.g., wind and solar) to be integrated into the grid.”).
217. Eisen, supra note 214, at 71.
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may produce more emissions than grid power generation.218 Some
scholars and analysts have expressed a similar concern that demand
response may actually increase carbon emissions. This is because
demand response, responding to economic incentives, may shift
electricity use from high-cost peak load periods to lower-cost off peak
periods. But more generation during off peak periods comes from coalfired power plants, whereas generation during peak load involves more
relatively low-emission natural gas plants.219
FERC’s own analysis has been cautious, referring to “possible
environmental benefits” from demand response.220 FERC notes that
“[d]emand response may provide environmental benefits by reducing
generation plants’ emissions during peak periods,” but also that
“[r]eductions during peak periods should be balanced against possible
emissions increases during off-peak hours, as well as from increased use
of on-site generation.”221 FERC’s Orders 719 and 745 do not ascribe any
environmental benefits to demand response.
To some extent, FERC’s reticence to consider the environmental
implications of demand response may reflect the factual uncertainty over
those implications. But FERC’s reticence likely also reflects its
continuing legal position that the just and reasonable standard does not
incorporate environmental considerations.222 Supportive of this
conclusion, FERC exempted Order 719 and Order 745 from NEPA
review on the ground that it merely involved “rates and charges for the
transmission or sale [of electric energy].”223
The overall environmental effect of demand response likely depends
218. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,664 (citing the comment of the Electric Power Supply
Association); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-73, ELECTRICITY MARKETS:
DEMAND-RESPONSE ACTIVITIES HAVE INCREASED, BUT FERC COULD IMPROVE DATA
COLLECTION AND REPORTING EFFORTS 46 (2014) (noting that “[s]ome consumers may use backup
generators . . . to generate electricity to offset some or all of their demand reductions” and that such
generators “may be more polluting than the power plants serving the grid”).
219. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE GREEN GRID: ENERGY SAVINGS AND CARBON
EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENABLED BY A SMART GRID 6-5 (2008); Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 926–27 (2015);
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for
Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1541–43 (2012).
220. See ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE, supra note 204, at 6.
221. Id.
222. See Regulations Implementing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 52 Fed. Reg.
47,897, 47,900 (Dec. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 380); Monongahela Power
Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,350, 62,096–97 (1987).
223. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,677 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a)(15)); Wholesale
Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,165 (Oct. 28,
2008) (to be codified at 18 C. F. R. pt. 35) (citing 18 C. F. R. § 380.4(a)(15)).
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on the relative balance between load-shifting measures and loadreducing measures.224 Load-shifting measures are not likely to reduce
(and may even increase) energy use and emissions,225 whereas loadreducing measures reduce energy use and emissions. The available
evidence suggests that demand response measures will tend to reduce
energy use and emissions.226 The evidence also indicates that demand
response’s indirect environmental effects, which operate by facilitating
greater integration of renewable energy generation, will have an even
greater environmental benefit.227
Because of the differing impacts of load-shifting versus load-reducing
demand response, whether demand response results in environmental
benefits depends, to a significant extent, on how it is managed and what
forms of demand response are incentivized. Under FERC’s
interpretation, ratified by the courts, the Federal Power Act gives FERC
little, if any, authority to regulate energy transactions. This includes
demand response, for the direct purpose of accomplishing environmental
objectives.228 Other federal, state, and local regulators, however, do have
that authority. Pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act, for
example, EPA regulates diesel generators that are sometimes used for
on-site generation as part of demand response.229 Included in these
224. See DAVITO ET AL., supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining how demand
response utilizes both load-shifting and load-reducing measures).
225. But see Carl Imhoff, Policies Get Smart, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 1, 2008, at 28 (contending
that even load-shifting demand response measures can reduce emissions by shifting load from peak
periods served by less efficient peaking plants to “shoulder periods” served by more efficient
plants).
226. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 219, at 6-2 to 6-5 (citing results of an
assessment of California concluding that demand response technology results in net energy savings
and a study modeling New England concluding that demand response reduces emissions of carbon
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur oxides); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., CARBON DIOXIDE
REDUCTIONS FROM DEMAND RESPONSE 1 (2014) (estimating that demand response “can directly
reduce CO2 emissions by more than 1 percent through peak load reductions and provision of
ancillary services”).
227. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 219, at 9-2 to 9-3 (estimating that demand
response and other Smart Grid infrastructure may reduce U.S. CO 2 emissions by between 18 and 37
million metric tons by 2030); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., supra note 226, at 1 (estimating that
demand response “can indirectly reduce CO2 emissions by more than 1 percent through accelerating
changes in the fuel mix and increasing renewable penetration”).
228. See DAVITO ET AL., supra note 203 and accompanying text.
229. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal
Combustion Engines, New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion
Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. 6674 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). The 2013 rule’s
100-hour limit, with the goal of enabling greater use of generators for demand response to promote
grid reliability, relaxed a 2010 rule that limited backup generators to fifteen hours per year as part of
a demand response program. Id. at 6675. The D.C. Circuit recently vacated this portion of the 2013
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regulations are specific limits on the operation of such generators for
demand response.230 Ultimately, demand response appears to have
significant potential to reduce air pollutant emissions, if supported by
environmental policies that channel demand response toward
environmentally beneficial energy usage.
FERC’s efforts to expand demand response through wholesale
markets hit a significant legal snag in 2014. Five energy industry
associations231 petitioned for review of Order 745 in the D.C. Circuit. On
May 23, 2014, a divided panel of that court vacated Order 745—holding
that it exceeded FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale electric power
markets under the Federal Power Act.232 The panel majority held that
demand response, because it involves end users of electricity who are
customers in the retail market, is inherently a phenomenon of the retail
market and therefore outside of FERC’s jurisdiction.233 FERC filed a
successful petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which will hear
the case in its October 2015 Term.234 Even if FERC is unsuccessful in
reviving Order 745, it still may find ways to preserve or extend other
demand response initiatives, including assisting states in developing
robust demand response policies.235
3.

Energy Storage

In recent years, FERC has issued several orders relating to energy
storage. As with the transmission planning and demand response orders,
rule and remanded it to EPA. See Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 15–
18 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (faulting EPA for failing to respond adequately to concerns raised in public
comments, relying on faulty evidence, failing to consider limiting the exception to areas not served
by organized capacity markets, and not obtaining the views of FERC or the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation); see also infra note 333.
230. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal
Combustion Engines, New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion
Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6679–81.
231. The five petitioners, aligned with the interests of electric power generators who under Order
745 faced competition from demand response resources bidding into wholesale electric power
markets, were the Electric Power Supply Association, American Public Power Association,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, and Edison
Electric Institute. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
232. See id. at 224.
233. Id. at 221.
234. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d 216, cert. granted sub nom, EnerNOC, Inc. v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015).
235. See, e.g., Jasmin Melvin, As Legal Challenges Drag on, States Must Take up Demand
Response Authority, Say Attorneys, INSIDE FERC, July 21, 2014, at 1 (noting that FERC has other
available mechanisms for promoting demand response).
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FERC has acted pursuant to its authority under the Federal Power Act to
ensure rates in wholesale electricity markets are “just and reasonable.”236
Also as with the transmission planning and demand response orders,
FERC—while maintaining a regulatory rationale rooted in economic
regulation—has adopted policies that have very significant
environmental impacts and environmental justifications.
Energy storage involves storing previously generated electricity and
then releasing it at a later time when it is more useful or valuable to the
grid.237 Energy storage technologies include “batteries, flywheels,
electrochemical capacitors, compressed air storage, thermal storage
devices and pumped hydroelectric power.”238 Although some forms of
energy storage—primarily pumped hydroelectric power—have been in
use for many decades, new technologies have the potential to increase
energy storage opportunities dramatically.239 At the same time, changes
to the electric power grid, including the integration of distributed
generation resources that generate variable amounts of power, are
increasing the value of storage that can release energy at short notice to
backup reductions in generation.240
In 2011, FERC issued Order 755,241 which requires RTOs and ISOs to
compensate frequency regulation in a manner that takes into account its
actual value to the grid. Frequency regulation involves a little known,
236. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received
by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates
or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is
hereby declared to be unlawful.”); id. § 824e(a) (directing FERC, when it has found a public utility
rate to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” to “determine the just and
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed
and in force, and shall fix the same by order”); id. § 824o(d)(2) (“The Commission may approve, by
rule or order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it determines
that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public
interest.”).
237. MATTHEW DEAL ET AL., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 2 (2010), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/reports.htm. See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering
Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 705–09
(2014) (summarizing energy storage technologies).
238. DEAL ET AL., supra note 237, at 3.
239. Stein, supra note 237, at 700.
240. See PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT NO.
NREL/TP-6A2-47187, THE ROLE OF ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
GENERATION 1, 17–18 (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf; Matthew
L. Wald, Energy Storage Plans Gain Ground in California, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2014, at B10.
241. See Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 755].
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but essential aspect of managing the electrical grid. The nature of
electric power is such that electrical grid operators, to maintain
reliability, must constantly balance supply and demand with very little
variation in frequency.242 This frequency regulation requires quick
responses, because both system load and generator output constantly
fluctuate.243 The faster a frequency regulation resource can respond
(ramping ability), and the more accurately it can respond, the more
valuable the resource to the grid.244 Traditionally, grid operators used
small generators, specially designed to respond to a grid operator’s
automatic generator control signal, for frequency regulation.245 More
recently, new resources such as demand response and energy storage can
be used for frequency regulation, often with faster ramping ability.246 In
2011, FERC determined that that RTOs and ISOs were not sufficiently
accounting for performance in compensating frequency regulation and
were not paying a uniform market-clearing price.247 Order 755
accordingly requires RTOs and ISOs to compensate frequency
regulation resources with a uniform price paid to all cleared resources
plus a performance payment reflecting ramping speed.248
In addition to Order 755, FERC has issued other orders that govern
the integration of energy storage into the electrical grid. FERC Order
784249 revised FERC’s accounting and reporting requirements to address
transactions associated with energy storage operations.250 FERC Order
792251 revised FERC’s Small Generator Interconnection Procedures and
Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to include energy
storage.252 Neither Order 784 nor 792 necessarily increases the

242. Id. at 67,261.
243. See BRENDAN J. KIRBY, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., NO. TM-2004/291, FREQUENCY
REGULATION
BASICS
AND
TRENDS
3
(2004),
available
at
http://ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100526085937Kirby,%20Frequency%20Regulation%20Basics%20and%20Trends.pdf.
244. Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,261.
245. See Kirby, supra note 243, at 3.
246. Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,261.
247. See id. at 67,260.
248. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(8) (2015).
249. Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New
Electric Storage Technologies, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,178 (July 30, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35, 101) [hereinafter Order 784].
250. Id. at 46,195–99.
251. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,240 (Dec. 5,
2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 792].
252. Id. at 73,269.
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incentives for energy storage, but both Orders attempt to ensure that
energy storage resources will have access to power markets under terms
and conditions comparable to those that apply to traditional power
resources.253
Environmental advocacy organizations commented in support of each
of FERC’s energy storage-related orders.254 These environmental
commenters attributed their participation to their objective of promoting
integration of energy efficiency, demand response, and renewable
resources into the electricity grid.255
4.

Standard Interconnection Agreements

One of the most important legal drivers of innovation in the electric
power industry has been FERC’s efforts to develop competitive power
markets, beginning with Order 888, which is founded on the principle of
non-discriminatory open access to transmission services.256
“Interconnection is an element of transmission,” FERC concluded.257
FERC thereafter issued Order 2003, which requires utilities to adopt
certain standard generator interconnection procedures and an
agreement.258 In issuing Order 2003, FERC explained that a competitive
transmission market requires “relatively unencumbered entry into the
market,” that interconnection provides a mechanism for market entry,
and that creating a standard set of procedures and agreement for
interconnections would facilitate interconnection.259 Order 2003,
however, applies only to large generators with capacity greater than
twenty megawatts.260
253. See, e.g., Order 784, supra note 249, at 46,199.
254. See Order 792, supra note 251, at 73,277 (listing Public Interest Organizations, which
includes numerous environmental groups, and the Union of Concerned Scientists as commenters);
Order 784, supra note 249, at 46,212 (listing Public Interest Organizations, which includes
numerous environmental groups, as commenters); Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,285 (listing the
Environmental Defense Fund and Public Interest Organizations as commenters).
255. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Comment Letter on Proposed Rulemaking on Frequency
Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets 1 (May 2, 2011)
(commenting on Order 755, supra note 241).
256. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R pts. 35
and 385) [hereinafter Order 888]; see also supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
257. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg.
22,250, 22,251 (proposed May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
258. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg.
49,846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2003].
259. Id. at 49,848.
260. Id. at 49,846. Because they apply to large generators, the procedures are known as the Large
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In 2005, FERC issued Order 2006, which sets forth standard
interconnection procedures and an agreement for small generators with
capacity of twenty megawatts or less.261 Since issuing Order 2006,
FERC has followed up with Order 792, which amends the small
generator procedures to further facilitate interconnection by small
generators.262 In support of Order 792, FERC cited the strong growth in
small-scale, grid-connected renewable energy generation, driven in part
by state renewable portfolio standards, which will create a need for more
interconnections.263 Order 792 also clarified that the definition of a small
generation facility under Order 2006 may include energy storage
devices.264
B.

Environmental Policies that Align with Energy Objectives

Like FERC, EPA has pursued policies that create energy-environment
alignments. One of EPA’s policies that aligns with energy objectives
occurred at Congress’s direction in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990.265 Another more recent policy, the much-anticipated and wildly
controversial Clean Power Plan, occurred at the agency’s own initiative.
1.

Acid Rain Program’s Conservation and Renewable Energy
Credits

In the 1980s, television, newspapers, and scientific journals published
alarming reports of the problem of acid rain.266 Acidic precipitation
Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP). Id. at 49,847. FERC initially proposed
interconnection procedures that would have applied to all generators, but then severed small
generators into a separate rulemaking after concluding that the procedures for large generators
would impose unnecessary burdens on small generators. Id. at 49,848–49.
261. See Order 2006, supra note 7. The procedures are known as the Small Generator
Interconnection Procedures (SGIP). Id. at 34,190.
262. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,240 (Dec. 5,
2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 792].
263. Id. at 73,245.
264. Id. at 73,269.
265. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
266. As EPA has described,
Acid rain is the accepted term which encompasses a complex set of phenomena that begins
with fossil fuel emissions, includes the transport and transformation of those emissions through
the atmosphere, and ends with the effects of those emissions and their resulting transformation
products on the environment . . . . The presence of these emissions and their transformation
products in the atmosphere contributes to reduced visibility and is suspected of posing a threat
to human health at current levels.
Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess
Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,004 (proposed Dec. 3, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
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caused by sulfur dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels was killing
trees, fish, and aquatic vegetation.267 A New York Times opinion piece
labeled acid rain the Stealthy Destruction from the Sky.268
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments created a regulatory program to
address the problem of acid rain.269 The program initiated a cap-andtrade system that mandated reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions,
primarily from coal-fired power plants owned by electric utilities, and
allowed regulated sources to market their unused emission
allowances.270 The program allocated up to 300,000 bonus allowances271
for electric utilities that reduced their sulfur dioxide emissions earlier
than required by using energy conservation measures or renewable
energy sources.272
To qualify for these special allowances, electric utilities had to meet
specified standards.273 The program was available only to utilities that
owned or operated at least one generation unit regulated by the new Acid
Rain Program.274 Electric utility companies had to designate the energy
conservation measures and renewable energy sources that formed the
basis for the allowances they sought.275 They also had to quantify the
sulfur dioxide emissions avoided through these measures and sources in

72, 73, 75, 77).
267. Philip H. Abelson, Acid Rain, 221 SCIENCE 115, 115 (1983); Acid Rain Assailed in New
Hampshire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/10/us/acid-rainassailed-in-new-hampshire.html; Ronald Kotulak, ‘Acid Rain’ Means a Dead Lake, ‘Acid Rain’
Means Pollution, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), Apr. 4, 1982, at D4; Tapped Out: Vermont’s
Poor
Maple
Sap
Harvest
Linked
to
Acid
Rain,
NBC
LEARN,
https://highered.nbclearn.com/portal/site/HigherEd/flatview?cuecard=41184 (last visited Nov. 8,
2015) (providing transcript of NBC News broadcast from Apr. 18, 1987).
268. Maureen Ogden, Op-Ed., Stealthy Destruction from the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1983, at
NJ34.
269. Clean Air Act §§ 401–416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2012).
270. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1144 (2009); Spence, supra note 16, at 190.
271. Each allowance authorizes a source to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide. Clean Air Act
§ 402(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3).
272. Id. § 404(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f). In addition to the bonus allowances that reward early
emissions reductions, utilities can also effectively earn allowances by adopting conservation
measures that reduce electric power generation; such conservation measures automatically earn
allowances when the utility reduces generation and therefore emissions. See EPA Pushes ‘NegaAllowances’ to Boost DSM as Tool to Cut Acid Rain Emissions, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Nov. 13, 1992,
at 4.
273. Clean Air Act § 404(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f)(2)(B).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(v).
275. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D)(i)(I).
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accordance with EPA regulations.276 To qualify for the special
allowances, energy conservation or renewable energy measures had to
be consistent with a plan for meeting demand “at the lowest system
cost.”277 The Secretary of Energy had to certify that adopting energy
conservation measures would not reduce the electric utility’s net
income.278 The state regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the utility
had to certify the accuracy of the utility’s application for special
allowances.279
Some of these requirements pertained to the environmental objectives
of the Acid Rain Program. Limiting the special allowances to utilities
that were part of the Acid Rain Program, requiring the utilities to
provide evidence and quantification of reduced energy use, and requiring
the utilities to obtain a certification from their state regulatory authorities
all helped to ensure that the special allowances were granted for actual
emissions reductions.
But other of these requirements pertained to energy policy, not
environmental, objectives. The idea of meeting demand “at the lowest
system cost” incorporates energy law’s objective of keeping energy
costs low—for example, as reflected in the “just and reasonable”
standard that pervades energy statutes.280 The requirement that energy
conservation measures may not reduce a utility’s net income derives
276. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D)(i)(II).
277. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(iii).
278. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(iv).
279. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D).
280. See supra Part I.A. To be more specific, “lowest system cost” is associated with the concept
of integrated resource planning, which originated in the 1980s. See Lesley K. McAllister, Adaptive
Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2115, 2151 (2011). Integrated resource
planning is “a planning and selection process for new energy resources that evaluates the full range
of alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at the
lowest system cost.” 16 U.S.C. § 2602(19) (2012). This contrasts with more traditional energy
approaches, which focused on supply-side alternatives and neglected demand-side measures. See
McAllister, supra, at 2151. Subsequent to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 imposed some integrated resource planning requirements on the energy sector. See 15
U.S.C. § 3203(b)(3) (2012) (requiring gas utilities to employ integrated resource planning “to
provide adequate and reliable service to its gas customers at the lowest system cost”); 16 U.S.C.
§ 831m-1(b)(1) (requiring the Tennessee Valley Authority to “employ and implement a planning
and selection process for new energy resources which evaluates the full range of existing and
incremental resources . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to electric customers of
the Tennessee Valley Authority at the lowest system cost”); id. § 2621(d)(7) (requiring electric
utilities to employ integrated resource planning); 42 U.S.C. § 7275(2) (defining “integrated resource
planning” as “a planning process for new energy resources that evaluates the full range of
alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at the
lowest system cost”); id. § 7276(a) (requiring customers of the Western Area Power Administration
“to implement . . . integrated resource planning”).
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from concerns that energy conservation, by reducing electric power
sales, can undermine utilities’ cost recovery structure.281
Thus, the Clean Air Act’s Conservation and Renewable Energy
Credits were as much an energy policy as they were an environmental
policy.282 Indeed, the congressional authors of the program argued to the
energy sector that their legislation “provides an opportunity” for utilities,
state public utility commissions, and utility customers—in addition to
environmental interests—to benefit.283
2.

Clean Power Plan

EPA’s Clean Power Plan is the centerpiece of the agency’s efforts to
address climate change.284 The problem of anthropogenic climate change
looms over all other environmental issues, in terms of the scope of the
harms it threatens and the complexities and difficulties of both the
problem and potential mitigating responses.285 While Congress has failed
281. See Edward J. Markey & Carlos J. Moorhead, The Clean Air Act and Bonus Allowances,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1991, at 31, 31–32 (noting that “this element is critical to the successful
pursuit of conservation measures because it addresses the revenue loss and other financial penalties
traditionally associated with reduced electricity sales”). A similar concern applies to demand
response, where FERC has acknowledged the possibility that “dispatching demand response
resources may result in an increased cost per unit ($/MWh) to the remaining wholesale load
associated with the decreased amount of load paying the bill.” Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,659.
In Order 745, FERC referred to this as the “billing unit effect.” Id. To address the billing unit effect
in demand response, FERC Order 745 requires RTOs and ISOs to use a “net benefits test,” which
“ensure[s] that the overall benefit of the reduced LMP that results from dispatching demand
response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources.” Id. FERC’s
net benefits test thus performs a function similar to the “net income” test in the Clean Air Act Acid
Rain Program. Id.
282. See Markey & Moorhead, supra note 281, at 31 (hailing the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 as “the most important and far-reaching energy legislation considered by the president and
Congress in a decade”).
283. See id. at 33–34.
284. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 20,
2015), http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (referring to
the Clean Power Plan as “a historic and important step in reducing carbon pollution from power
plants that takes real action on climate change”).
285. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2009) (explaining that climate
change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous interdependencies, uncertainties,
circularities, and conflicting stakeholders”; because “the longer it takes to address the problem, the
harder it will be to do so”; because “those who are in the best position to address the problem . . .
[have] the least immediate incentive to act”; and because of “the absence of an existing institutional
framework of government with the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary
to address a problem of climate change’s tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); Kelly Levin et
al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked”
Problem of Global Climate Change 5–8 (June 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
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to take significant action on the issue,286 EPA has moved forward with
addressing climate change under its existing statutory authorities,
primarily the Clean Air Act.287 Because energy-related activities account
for the vast majority of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States,288 they have been the focus of EPA’s climate change
regulatory initiatives.289
In October 2015, EPA published its Clean Power Plan, which requires
states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired
electric generating units by thirty percent by 2030.290 EPA promulgated
the Clean Power Plan under Clean Air Act section 111(d), which directs
the agency to establish a procedure for states to develop standards of
performance for certain existing sources of air pollutant emissions.291
Section 111 provides that the standards must limit emissions to the
extent “achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction.”292 EPA’s Plan identifies three categories of strategies—
which EPA calls “building blocks”—that can comprise a best system of
emission reduction.293 First, states can improve operation and
maintenance and add equipment upgrades that improve the fuel
efficiency of existing coal plants.294 Second, states can shift generation
Washington Law Review) (originating the term “super wicked” and applying it to the problem of
climate change).
286. See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate
Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010, at 53; Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at
70.
287. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–38 (2014); Climate Change:
Regulatory Initiatives, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html.
288. See INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 1, at 3-1
(reporting that, in 2012, energy-related activities accounted for 84.3% of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States).
289. In addition to the proposed performance standards for existing power plants, other EPA
climate change regulation has addressed emissions from vehicles, see, e.g., 2017 and Later Model
Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536,
537), and proposed performance standards for new power plants, see Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
290. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
291. Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
292. Id. § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).
293. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
294. Id. at 64,745. The equipment upgrades do not include construction of carbon capture and
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from coal plants to existing natural gas-fired power plants.295 Third,
states can increase their use of renewable and nuclear power plants.296
States can choose from among these building blocks to meet their statespecific emissions reduction goals.297
In issuing the Plan, EPA acknowledged that it would have important
ramifications for the operation of the electric power system, including
grid reliability.298 EPA intends for its Plan to “reinforce” efforts that
states and utilities are making to modernize their electric power
systems.299 EPA developed its proposal with the intent to give states
sufficient flexibility to develop carbon reduction plans that also fully
satisfy their energy policy goals, such as preserving diversity of fuel
sources, maintaining reliability, and providing affordable electricity.300
In furtherance of this goal, EPA undertook extensive consultation with
governmental and non-governmental actors from the energy sector,
including FERC, state energy regulators, and system operators.301

storage technology or converting coal plants to natural gas, both of which EPA concluded would
likely be more expensive than other emissions reduction strategies. Id. at 64,728.
295. Id. at 64,745–47.
296. Id. at 64,747–78. EPA’s proposed rule included a fourth building block, improved end-use
energy efficiency. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,858, 34,871–75 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). EPA had estimated that states could reduce their electricity use by at
least 1.5% through energy efficiency measures and had factored emissions reductions through
increased end-use energy efficiency into each state’s emissions limitations. Id. at 34,872. The final
Clean Power Plan allows states to use end-use energy efficiency as a means of meeting their
emissions limitations, but does not use end-use energy efficiency as a factor in determining states’
emissions limitations. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,673–74.
297. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,665 (“States will have the flexibility to choose from a range of
plan approaches and measures, including numerous measures beyond those considered in setting the
CO2 emission performance rates, and this final rule allows and encourages states to adopt the most
effective set of solutions for their circumstances, taking account of cost and other considerations.”).
298. Id. at 64,663, 63,671.
299. Id. at 64,678.
300. Id. at 64,679.
301. Id. at 64,704–07 (describing EPA meetings with stakeholders). Some difference of opinion
exists as to whether EPA’s Plan contains sufficient flexibility in its requirements that it can avoid
negatively affecting grid reliability. Compare id. at 64,679 (predicting that Plan will “maintain[] the
reliability . . . of electricity in the U.S.”), with Bobby McMahon, FERC, DOE to Coordinate with
EPA on Reliability as Commissioners Speak Out on CPP, INSIDE FERC, Aug. 10, 2015, at 1 (noting
concerns, including some from FERC commissioners, that the Clean Power Plans will negatively
affect reliability).
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Bridging the Energy-Environment Divide

The policies described in this Part302 represent a distinctive type of
energy-environment policy interaction. A policy alignment involves
policies in one field that align with, without directly adopting, the
objectives of another field—for example, energy policies that align with
environmental objectives, and environmental policies that align with
energy objectives. Policy alignments avoid much of the dysfunctionality
of the energy-environment divide that is perpetuated and exacerbated by
the more typical energy and environmental policies described earlier in
this Article.303
1.

Key Characteristics

Energy-environment policy alignments have certain key
characteristics that define them as a category and help to distinguish
them from other approaches to managing energy-environment
interrelationships. Policy alignments simultaneously support the policy
objectives of multiple interacting legal fields—here, energy law and
environmental law. Energy-environment policy alignments occur when
energy policies, while still promoting energy objectives, align with
environmental objectives or when environmental policies, while still
promoting environmental objectives, align with energy objectives.
Policy alignments thus reflect several important insights regarding
energy-environment interactions: energy and environmental goals are
not necessarily in conflict; energy and environmental goals indeed may
be complementary; and energy and environmental policies can aim to
leverage complementarity rather than just to manage conflict.
Aligned policies support the objectives of other fields while
maintaining their focus on the objectives of their own field. The energy
policies discussed in Part III.A derive their authority and objectives from
the Federal Power Act. Although the effect of these energy policies is to
encourage conditions that yield environmental benefits, they retain their
focus on economic regulation to promote efficient energy markets. The
environmental policies discussed in Part III.B derive their authority and
objectives from the Clean Air Act.304 Although the effect of these
302. See supra Part III.A−B.
303. See supra Parts III.
304. The Acid Rain Program discussed supra in Part III.B.1 did involve a legislative amendment
to the Clean Air Act as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. But the Acid Rain
Program—although innovative in its use of market-based regulatory mechanisms, see Jonathan B.
Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global
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environmental policies is to encourage conditions that maintain or
improve the efficiency of energy markets, they retain their overall
primary focus on limiting air pollutant emissions.
Policy alignments thus enable FERC to generate environmental
benefits without adopting environmental objectives, and EPA to promote
the efficiency of energy markets without adopting energy objectives. In
both cases, a modest but significant reframing of the regulatory
framework within each field allows the development of complementary
policies that create synergistic policy alignments with other fields.
Policy alignments do not require either FERC or EPA to depart from its
established policy objectives or statutory authorities.
That being said, although policy alignments firmly reside within their
respective fields, they also challenge traditional legal categories. FERC’s
Order 1000,305 for example, is in many respects a typical energy
regulation. It was issued by FERC, an energy regulator; is directed at
RTOs and ISOs, paragons of the energy sector; under the auspices of the
Federal Power Act, a canonical energy statute.306 But by other measures
Order 1000 is significantly environmental: Its environmental effects may
exceed those of many environmental policies and environmental
organizations actively participated in FERC’s rulemaking process.307
Similar observations can be made about EPA’s proposed Clean Power
Plan. It is being developed by EPA, an environmental regulator; is
directed at power plants, classic targets of environmental regulation;
under the authority of the Clean Air Act, a canonical environmental
statute.308 But the effects of the Clean Power Plan on the energy sector
are such that it may be one of the most important energy policies in
recent history.
Although policy alignments involve overlapping regulatory areas,
they differ substantially from the type of intensive interagency effort
required in, for example, a joint rulemaking. 309 Policy alignments allow
each agency to stay within its traditional statutory framework; the
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1315 (2001)—is very much exemplary of the
emissions limitation-based approach to environmental regulation that pervades environmental law.
Thus, the Acid Rain Program retained the Clean Air Act’s overall structure and objectives.
305. Order 1000, supra note 174.
306. See supra Part III.A.1.
307. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part III.B.2.
309. See, e.g., Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Mediumand Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, 1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1065, 1066, 1068) (joint rule of EPA and
Department of Transportation).
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interdependence of the agencies’ policies does not create formally
shared regulatory space.310 This phenomenon obviates some of the need
for formal coordination mechanisms.311 Policy alignments can instead
rely on informal coordination mechanisms, which can be as simple as
considering another agency’s regulatory activities, without detailed
direct communication.312 In this way, policy alignments can create law
that takes advantages of potential synergies across legal fields without
creating complex and potentially burdensome new regulatory bodies or
legal regimes.
When more active coordination or interagency supervision is needed,
it is available as an option to agencies. Active coordination has
advantages—it may allow agencies, for example, to leverage their
respective expertise.313 By not requiring active coordination, however,
policy alignments allow agencies to tailor the extent of their
coordination to the specific circumstances of their interdependence.
Most of the policy alignments discussed in this Article, for example,
appear not to have involved active collaboration between FERC and
EPA, and there is no indication that the policies were weaker as a result.
Concerns about the reliability impacts of the Clean Power Plan,
however, appear to be leading to more active coordination between
FERC and EPA.314
310. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012) (discussing the “shared regulatory space” created by “fragmented
and overlapping delegations of power to administrative agencies”).
311. Cf. id. at 1145–51 (discussing “four types of multiple-agency delegations”: “overlapping
agency functions,” “related jurisdictional assignments,” “interacting jurisdictional assignments,”
and “delegations requiring concurrence”).
312. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 290 (2011); cf. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 310, at 1156
(“Informal coordination regularly occurs without any explicit communication between agencies, as
where one agency observes what another agency is doing or anticipates another agency’s decisions
and adjusts its decisions accordingly to avoid tension or friction.”).
313. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 310, at 1184; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political”
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2010) (noting benefits of
presidential supervision, including coordinating agencies).
314. See, e.g., Letter from Norman C. Bay, Chairman, FERC et al., to Janet G. McCabe, Acting
Assistant Adm’r, Office of Air & Radiation, EPA (May 15, 2015), available at
https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2015/ferc-letter-epa.pdf (noting that FERC held a series of
technical conferences regarding the implications of the Clean Power Plan for grid reliability and
addressing issues raised at the conferences); Keith Goldberg, EPA Leaning on FERC to Blunt Clean
Power Plan Grid Effect, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/648711/epa-leaning-on-ferc-to-blunt-clean-power-plan-grid-effect (noting statements from
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy that EPA worked closely with FERC to address concerns about
the effects of the Clean Power Plan on grid reliability). The apparent ability and willingness of EPA
and FERC to modulate their extent of collaboration based on the circumstances—for example,
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Advantages

Energy-environment policy alignments provide an alternative to
requirements as a means of managing interactions between energy law
and environmental law. Although requirements have their benefits, and
even may be necessary in some situations, in many circumstances policy
alignments exhibit strong advantages over requirements.
Both policy alignments and requirements are means of managing
interactions across legal fields and across agency jurisdictions.
Requirements manage those interactions by imposing negative
constraints—that is, by placing limits on one field to prevent it from
interfering with another field. Thus, for example, the Clean Air Act’s
conformity requirement prevents FERC’s energy programs—as well as
other agencies’ programs—from causing certain deteriorations in air
quality.315 In doing so, however, the conformity requirement may
prevent projects that would advance FERC’s goal of ensuring affordable
and ample energy supplies. RCRA’s hydraulic fracturing exclusion
similarly prevents EPA’s hazardous waste regulations from interfering
with the production of oil and natural gas.316 In doing so, however, the
exclusion may prevent EPA from taking action against oil and gas
practices that threaten human or environmental health.
Policy alignments, by contrast, manage interactions between fields by
leveraging opportunities for policies that can simultaneously promote the
objectives of both fields, thereby creating interagency synergies. Thus,
FERC’s demand response orders utilize a traditional mechanism of
energy regulation—rate regulation—to regulate the price paid for
demand response services.317 In doing so, FERC incentivizes reductions
in electricity usage that advance an energy policy objective—increasing
the economic efficiency and competitiveness of wholesale electric power
markets—and also potentially promote the environmental goal of
reducing emissions from electric power generation. EPA’s Clean Power
Plan will similarly incentivize reductions in unnecessary electricity
generation, advancing the agency’s environmental goals while also

collaborating more actively with respect to the Clean Power Plan than for transmission planning—
may alleviate concerns that agencies will take advantage of informal coordination to avoid more
costly active collaboration mechanisms, such as joint rulemaking, even when more active
collaboration would be worthwhile.
315. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Air Act § 176, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7506 (2012)).
316. See supra notes 128–29 (discussing RCRA § 3001(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)).
317. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing FERC Orders 719 and 745).
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promoting more efficient energy markets.318 The Power Plan, moreover,
utilizes a traditional environmental policy mechanism—limiting
pollutant emissions—to accomplish its objective.319
The energy-environment policy alignments described above320 are
taking advantage of opportunities created by dramatic changes in the
energy sector focused in electricity markets. For example, energy
technologies such as renewable energy generation, demand response,
and energy storage are creating opportunities for energy options that are
more economically efficient and less environmentally harmful. The
existence of these opportunities creates a space for potential energyenvironment policy synergies that FERC and EPA can promote through
policy alignments.
The frequent and active participation of environmental organizations
in FERC rulemaking proceedings321 suggests that the potential
environmental benefits of FERC policies are perceived as real and
significant. The mixed reaction of FERC and state energy regulators to
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, by contrast, may suggest that its potential
energy benefits are less clear or more contingent. Alternatively, critiques
of the Clean Power Plan coming from some corners of the energy sector
may merely indicate that the Plan threatens to disrupt the energy sector,
which may in fact enhance efficiency and competition.
Policy alignments, when feasible, provide a model for managing
energy-environment interactions that is generally superior to the
negative constraints model exemplified by energy requirements and
environmental requirements. The negative constraints model applies
only in the event of a conflict between energy objectives and
environmental objectives and attempts to manage that conflict by
imposing limits on each respective field. Policy alignments, by contrast,
attempt to direct energy and environmental policies in mutually
compatible and even complementary directions—for example, by
creating incentives for energy markets to develop in ways that both

318. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan).
319. A skeptic might dispute the distinction between negative constraints and synergies, and
argue that the policy alignments outlined in Part III.A–B also operate as negative constraints—for
example, that Acid Rain Program’s Conservation and Renewable Energy Credits impose limits on
electric power. This may be true of emissions limitations generally; emissions limitations constrain
the generation of electric power for the sake of environmental benefits. Conservation and renewable
energy credits, by contrast, take advantage of ways of generating power that promote both energy
objectives and environmental objectives.
320. See supra Part III.A–B.
321. See supra notes 194–97, 215–16, 254–55 and accompanying text.
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increase economic efficiency and reduce pollutant emissions.322
3.

Limitations

Despite their advantage over negative constraints, policy alignments
are not superior in every respect. Alignments have limitations that
should be considered in designing policies to manage energyenvironment interactions.
First, policy alignments only work when interacting objectives can be
reconciled. To the extent objectives pose unavoidable conflicts,
requirements may be necessary, as a backstop to alignments, to manage
those conflicts. Indeed, even the policy alignments described above use
requirements to a limited extent. Because demand response can lead to
diesel-powered on-site generation with high pollutant emissions, EPA
regulations limit the use of diesel generators for demand response.323
The Acid Rain program’s energy conservation credits also contain
requirements that limit the use of energy conservation to ensure that
energy conservation programs do not unduly increase electricity rates or
undermine a utility’s cost recovery structure.324 Concern about the
reliability impacts of the Clean Power Plan325 may indicate that some
energy requirements will be appropriate there as well.
The fact that requirements may sometimes be necessary, however,
does not undermine the contributions that policy alignments can make.
In fact, requirements and alignments can work together as part of an
overall strategy, with alignments leveraging synergies where they can be
created, and requirements managing conflicts where they unavoidably
occur. This is much better than relying merely on requirements, which
have effect only by imposing negative constraints.
Second, policy alignments also can call into question the legitimacy
of an agency action because they raise the prospect that an agency’s
322. The examples of energy-environment policy alignments offered here are not necessarily
ideal or optimal policies. FERC Order 745 has been accused of overcompensating demand response.
See Pierce, supra note 201, at 108. Order 1000 has been criticized for not requiring cost allocation
for non-transmission alternatives. See Welton & Gerrard, supra note 186, at 11. EPA’s Clean Power
Plan has been maligned for allegedly threatening grid reliability. See McMahon, supra note 301.
Whether or not any of these specific criticisms are accurate, the policies inevitably will fall short of
their ambitious objectives in some respect. But no policies are perfect, and none of these criticisms
calls into question the general approach of policy alignments as a model for managing the energyenvironment relationship. Similar shortcomings may pervade policies that follow the negative
constraints model.
323. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 301.
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motives may diverge from its stated objectives. For example, despite
FERC’s stated justification for Order 1000, which relied exclusively on
Federal Power Act section 206’s authority to set just and reasonable
rates for electricity transmission services,326 some may suspect that
FERC’s reliance on section 206 was pretextual, and that the agency
issued Order 1000 to promote renewable energy development for
environmental reasons, which would be contrary to the agency’s
proffered rationale for the rule and arguably contrary to FERC’s own
interpretations of its statutory authority under the Federal Power Act.327
Remarks by commentators praising Order 1000 for its environmental
benefits328 may stoke such concerns. A lack of transparency and
departure from statutory authority are among the graver sins an agency
can commit.329 Transparency begets accountability, which in turn begets
legitimacy.330 Thus, the legitimacy of an agency’s action may be called
into question if its policy alignments implicate objectives that the agency
does not acknowledge and that are outside of the agency’s mandate.331
However, rationality—another core dictate for agencies332—requires
taking into account interactions among regulatory programs. The mere
fact that FERC’s actions in furtherance of the Federal Power Act’s
energy policy objectives may also create additional, environmental
benefits not endorsed by FERC’s statutes but complementary to EPA’s
regulatory programs should not impugn the legitimacy of FERC’s
326. See, e.g., Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,844.
327. See supra note 118.
328. See, e.g., James & Allen, supra note 175 (opining that Order 1000 represents a “huge step”
toward clean energy).
329. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
494 F.3d 188, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating agency rule because the agency failed to disclose
supporting documents it relied upon to develop the rule); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that a federal agency is “a creature of statute” which has “only those
authorities conferred upon it by Congress”).
330. See Louis J. Virelli III, Science, Politics, and Administrative Legitimacy, 78 MO. L. REV.
511, 517 (2013).
331. In this respect, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), stands as a warning for agencies
whose motivations diverge from their statutory mandate. In that case, EPA had denied a rulemaking
petition for policy reasons that differed from the standard set forth in the Clean Air Act. Id. at 533–
34. The Supreme Court set aside EPA’s decision, holding that the agency must “exercise discretion
within defined statutory limits.” Id. at 533. The question of the validity of EPA’s action would have
become somewhat more complicated, however, had EPA cited reasons tied to the Clean Air Act
standard, while acting with other, unacknowledged motivations.
332. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (noting
that an agency’s statutory construction must be “rational and consistent with the statute”); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (holding that a court
reviewing agency action should inquire, among other things, whether action was rational).
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actions. Indeed, taking into account the interaction of overlapping and
related regulatory programs allows them to work as a coherent whole.
As long as an agency, by considering these impacts, does not contradict
congressional directives, it should be valid.333
Third, policy alignments introduce greater complexity in policy
design. Agencies face numerous challenges in achieving the ambitious
policy goals with which they are charged: statutes that grant only limited
statutory authority, budgets that restrict resources, and often hostile
members of Congress and outside interest groups that exert political
pressure. These challenges make it difficult enough for agencies to
accomplish their own objectives; asking agencies to consider other
agencies’ goals may seem like an absurd overreach.
The answer to this concern is that policy alignments may complicate
policy design, but they should often generate offsetting benefits that
justify the complication.334 Although asking agencies to consider an
expanded and diversified range of objectives in some senses increases
the complexity of their mission, it also aligns the programs with the
reality of the context in which they operate. Agencies that operate in
policy silos, unaware of how their policies interact with other agencies’
policies, cannot expect their policies to be effective. Other agencies’
objectives are an essential part of the policy context in which agencies
333. That being said, agencies must proceed cautiously in pursuing a policy objective that falls
primarily within another agency’s mission. The recent case of Delaware Department of Natural
Resources & Environmental Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), provides a cautionary tale
with regard to agency coordination, or lack thereof, in such situations. The case involved a
challenge to an EPA rule under the Clean Air Act regulating emissions from backup diesel
generators. Id. at 4. The rule allowed backup generators to operate for up to 100 hours per year for
emergency demand response to promote grid reliability. Id. at 6. Yet EPA had dismissed comments
questioning the rule’s relationship to grid reliability, noting that such concerns were primarily
within FERC’s authority. Id. at 18. In vacating that portion of the rule, the D.C. Circuit faulted EPA
for attempting to “have it both ways” by “simultaneously rely[ing] on reliability concerns and then
brush[ing] off comments about those concerns as beyond its purview.” Id. The court “encourage[d]”
EPA, on remand, to consult with FERC about the rule’s relationship to grid reliability. Id. Read
narrowly, Delaware merely stands for the rather obvious proposition that an agency should not
attempt to disavow responsibility for a policy objective it also cites as the basis for its rule. More
broadly, however, the case indicates that courts may be inclined to less deference when an agency
regulates to promote a policy objective that lies primarily within another agency’s expertise and
authority, especially when the agency taking the action has not consulted with the other, expert
agency.
334. The benefits of policy alignments to manage interactions across policy objectives likely
depends on the intensity of the interactions. In this regard, the energy-environment seems
particularly fruitful territory for using policy alignments. Energy and the environment have always
interrelated, but they are becoming increasingly interdependent. See supra notes 1–10 and
accompanying text. The development of a smart grid on the energy side and climate change
mitigation policies on the environmental side are creating more opportunities for policy alignments
that will allow energy and environmental policies to work in concert rather than at cross-purposes.
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operate, and so the effective implementation of agency policy demands
policy design that takes into consideration other agencies’ objectives.
Indeed, urging agencies to consider other agencies’ objectives
counteracts the tunnel vision that can afflict agencies and lead them to
pursue their otherwise legitimate objectives in ways that put them at
cross-purposes with broader policy goals335—the classic problem of
energy law, with its sometimes excessive devotion to reducing energy
prices. Asking agencies to consider other policy objectives beyond their
core mission internalizes tensions among policies; when agencies
maintain their blinders, the effects of policy interactions are externalized
to the regulated community and beneficiaries.
In addition, agencies already face mandates to consider other
agencies’ policy objectives, in the form of requirements such as those
described in Part II. The question frequently is not, therefore, whether to
require agencies to consider other policy goals, but rather how agencies
should consider other policy goals. And in this respect, it is not clear that
policy alignments are any more difficult or complex than requirements
for agencies to consider.
4.

Implications

Highlighting the contributions that policy alignments can make to
develop more coherent energy-environment policies has several
implications for scholars, advocates, analysts, and policymakers
interested in improving energy and environmental policy.
First, in thinking about ways to manage energy-environment
interactions, we should look for opportunities to create policy
alignments. The examples described above,336 which focus on federal
energy and environmental regulation of the electric power industry,
suggest that energy-environment policy alignments can be both feasible
and effective. It remains to be seen whether such opportunities can be
replicated in other energy markets.
Perhaps the most promising area for extending energy-environment
policy alignments is the natural gas industry. Domestic production of
natural gas has boomed in recent years.337 Natural gas also generates

335. Cf. Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1767 (2002)
(“‘Tunnel vision’ within agencies prevents them from considering ancillary effects . . . .”).
336. See supra Part III.A–B.
337. See John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 964–66 (2015).

04 - Aagaard.docx (Do Not Delete)

1578

12/21/2015 8:07 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1517

fewer pollutant emissions than other fossil fuels.338 As a result,
somewhat similar to electricity, natural gas provides the policy context
of an industry that is rapidly changing, potentially in ways with
significant environmental benefits.
Can FERC align its natural gas regulation with EPA’s environmental
regulation to create policy synergies? One of the difficulties of pursuing
policy synergies with natural gas is that it occupies a heavily contested
position in environmental policy.339 On the one hand, natural gas burns
significantly cleaner than coal or oil.340 On the other hand, natural gas
still generates emissions, unlike non-fossil-fuel energy sources.341
Energy-environment policy alignments in natural gas might also be
fruitful at the federal and state levels. One possible example would be
stricter state oil and gas conservation laws that would limit flaring or
venting natural gas, which would have the effects of avoiding waste—a
traditional objective of energy law—and reducing emissions.342
Second, analyses of the energy-environment divide and arguments in
favor of greener energy policies should take into account the subtle,
implicit, and indirect ways in which energy law and environmental law
already are interacting through policy alignments. These ongoing
alignments may somewhat undercut normative arguments for more
dramatic steps to integrate energy and environmental law. If, for
example, FERC Order 1000 can create something of a system of
interstate coordination of transmission needs arising from
environmentally inspired state-level Public Policy Requirements such as
338. See id. at 967–68.
339. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (2012) (arguing that the natural gas boom “will not take the U.S.
everywhere we would like to go, [but] it is likely to take the U.S. to a destination that is a major
improvement over the status quo, measured with reference to any plausible set of national or
international
goals”);
Why
Move
Beyond
Natural
Gas?,
SIERRA
CLUB,
http://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/why-move-beyond-natural-gas (last visited Oct. 2, 2015)
(“Fracking for natural gas damages the land, pollutes water and air, and causes illness in
surrounding communities. It is also a major threat to our climate. It is clear that we cannot transition
from one fossil fuel to another and expect to see major climate benefits.”).
340. See Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 341, 405 (2002) (noting that “natural gas is a cleaner fossil fuel than coal or oil”);
Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477,
490 (2011) (“Natural gas, in contrast to coal and oil, is a cleaner fossil fuel because it emits fewer
air pollutants (including greenhouse gases) when burned.”).
341. See Amy L. Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 651,
662–63 (2013).
342. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1014 (2015) (reviewing the problem of natural
gas flaring, and potential solutions, from oil wells in North Dakota).
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renewable portfolio standards, this may in turn somewhat reduce the
comparative advantages of federal-level Public Policy Requirements.343
Third, at the very least, we should recognize that existing energyenvironment policy alignments redefine the normative and descriptive
baseline from which arguments for integrating energy law and
environmental law should build. For example, arguments for creating
national renewable portfolio standards344 should take into account the
interstate coordination already underway pursuant to Order 1000, so as
to take advantage and account of those efforts and not to undermine
them.
Beyond questions of policy design, energy-environment policy
alignments—and in particular the development of energy policies that
align with environmental objectives without adopting those objectives—
should prompt us to broaden our understanding of what constitutes
environmental law. In previous work I have argued in favor of defining
environmental law as “laws that reflect a consideration of human
impacts on the natural environment.”345 I also have argued, however, in
favor of giving greater attention to indirect environmental laws that,
although not adopted for environmental purposes, have important
environmental effects.346 FERC policies that are part of energyenvironment policy alignments exemplify indirect environmental laws.
Using indirect environmental laws to pursue environmental objectives
through energy-environment policy alignments generates advantages
over relying solely on environmental statutes to address environmental
problems.347 As the energy-environment policy alignments illustrate,
indirect environmental laws can work synergistically with environmental
statutes.348 Indirect environmental law diversifies and expands the field
of environmental law, bringing a broader set of policy tools to bear on
environmental problems.349 The policy mechanisms of FERC’s
economic regulation—for example, rate setting—differ markedly from
EPA’s regulatory mechanisms under its pollution statutes, which
343. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 151 (arguing for advantages of federal renewable portfolio
standards).
344. See, e.g., id. at 1366–75.
345. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 221, 263 (2010).
346. Id. at 263–64 n.181. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law to
Accomplish Environmental Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 35 (2014) [hereinafter
Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law].
347. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law, supra note 346, at 55–59.
348. See id. at 55–56.
349. See id. at 56.
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primarily involve imposing limits on emissions. Indirect environmental
law also benefits from its non-environmental connections.350 FERC
policies that facilitate the development of renewable energy may reduce
pollutant emissions in ways not achievable by emissions limits alone.
Finally, indirect environmental laws involve different political dynamics
than environmental laws, which in some circumstances may be more
constructive than environmental law.351
CONCLUSION
Given the extensive overlap between energy and environmental
issues, energy regulators and environmental regulators must find some
way
to
manage
energy-environment
interactions.
These
interrelationships are tricky to manage, because energy law and
environmental law reflect divergent orientations that create tensions. The
traditional approach has attempted to manage energy-environment
interrelationships by imposing requirements—forms of negative
constraints—on each regulator. FERC’s energy policies must comply
with requirements set forth in environmental statutes, and EPA’s
environmental statutes contain energy-related requirements and
exemptions. But this approach exacerbates, rather than alleviates,
tensions between the divergent orientations of energy and environmental
law.
Policy alignments provide an innovative and attractive model for a
different approach to managing energy-environment relationships.
Policy alignments occur when policies within one field, while still
promoting the objectives of that field, align with the objectives of
another field as well. A string of recent FERC orders and EPA’s
proposed Clean Power Plan exemplify the ability of policy alignments
that effectuate both energy and environmental goals. The results are
energy and environmental policies that focus on creating energyenvironment synergies, rather than merely trying to avoid conflicts.
The policy alignment model has potential application beyond federal
energy and environmental law. Within energy and environmental law,
policy alignments may productively manage other areas of jurisdictional
overlap, such as the relationship between EPA and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration in regulating occupational health
risks.352 The policy alignment model also may provide an effective
350. See id. at 56–57.
351. See id. at 57–59.
352. See Aagaard, supra note 312 (describing EPA and OSHA policies within their area of
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mechanism for managing federal-state regulatory relationships within
energy and environmental law—for example, in the way that FERC’s
Order 1000 builds state public policy requirements into federal
transmission planning.353
The policy alignment model also may apply beyond the energyenvironment overlap as well. Many other legal fields—for example,
antitrust and securities regulation,354 environmental law and
bankruptcy,355 and criminal law and immigration law356—intersect,
sometimes creating tensions. Where there is tension or conflict, a
frequent approach is to arrange the competing paradigms in a
hierarchy—securities law trumps antitrust law,357 or bankruptcy trumps
environmental law.358 Such an approach is akin to the negative
constraints model reviewed and criticized in this Article.359 Although
conflicts may sometimes be unavoidable, and where they cannot be
avoided must be managed, a model of addressing inter-field
relationships that relies primarily or exclusively on negative constraints
sells short the possibilities for, and benefits of, reconciling overlapping
legal regimes. Hopefully FERC and EPA will continue to develop
energy-environment policy alignments, and thereby provide examples
for constructively managing energy-environment relationships—and
other intersecting fields as well.

jurisdictional overlap that resemble policy alignments).
353. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
355. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
356. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
357. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285 (holding that federal securities laws implicitly preclude
the application of antitrust laws to the alleged conduct of firms that market and distribute newly
issued securities).
358. See Jensen, 995 F.2d at 931 (holding that state’s claim for hazardous waste cleanup costs
was discharged in bankruptcy because state had pre-petition knowledge of debtors’ potential
liability).
359. See supra Part II.

